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UCC Section 9-315: A Historical and 
Modern Perspective 
David Frisch* 
INTRODUCTION 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code1 has frequently 
been described as a "floating lien" statute.2 In support of this 
sobriquet, it is standard fare to limit discussion to four of its 
provisions.3 There is, however, a fifth and largely ignored sec-
tion, UCC section 9-315, that is also supportive of the phrase 
"floating lien." This section, entitled "Priority When Goods 
Are Commingled or Processed," outlines the ways in which a 
party's perfected security interest in certain goods can continue 
in the product or mass into which those goods are manufac-
tured, processed, assembled, or commingled. 4 Section 9-315 is 
* Associate Professor of Law, Delaware Law School. The author wishes 
to acknowledge with thanks the assistance of James Godderz, a member of the 
class of 1985, Delaware Law School. 
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all references and citations in this Article 
to articles, sections, and comments of the Uniform Commercial Code are to 
the 1978 official text [hereinafter cited as the Code or the U.C.C.]. 
2. See, e.g., Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priori-
ties Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARV. L. REV. 838, 
839-40, 850-55 (1959); Jackson & Kronman, A Plea for the Financing Buyer, 85 
YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1975). 
3. Those provisions are: U.C.C. § 9-204(1) ("[A] security agreement may 
provide that any or all obligations covered by the security agreement are to be 
secured by after-acquired collateral."); U.C.C. § 9-204(3) ("Obligations covered 
by a security agreement may include future advances .... "); U.C.C. § 9-
306(2) ("[A] security interest continues ... in any identifiable proceeds includ-
ing collections received by the debtor."); and U.C.C. § 9-205 (the abolition of 
the policing rule of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925)). For a brief discus-
sion of Benedict, see infra note 83. 
4. The complete text of U.C.C. § 9-315 is as follows: 
Priority When Goods Are Commingled or Processed. 
(1) If a security interest in goods was perfected and subsequently 
the goods or a part thereof have become part of a product or mass, the 
security interest continues in the product or mass if 
(a) the goods are so manufactured, processed, assembled or commin-
gled that their identity is lost in the product or mass; or 
(b) a financing statement covering the original goods also covers the 
product into which the goods have been manufactured, processed 
or assembled. 
1 
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thus functionally similar to sections 9-306, covering proceeds, 
and 9-204, covering after-acquired collateral, in that each sec-
tion has the effect of transferring a secured party's lien to prop-
erty not subject to that lien at the time the parties entered into 
their secured transaction. Moreover, in situations covered by 
sections 9-306 and 9-315, this transfer can have significant prac-
tical consequences because whenever a secured party has lost, 
or is unable to assert, an in specie claim to the original collat-
eral,5 a derivative claim to substitute property is the only thing 
that prevents an unhappy slide into unsecured status.6 
Whatever justifications exist for having a system of secured 
In a case to which paragraph (b) applies, no separate security interest 
in that part of the original goods which has been manufactured, 
processed or assembled into the product may be claimed under Sec-
tion 9-314. 
(2) When under subsection (1) more than one security interest 
attaches to the product or mass, they rank equally according to the 
ratio that the cost of the goods to which each interest originally at-
tached bears to the cost of the total product or mass. 
5. The loss of an in specie claim could occur where the debtor's disposi-
tion of the original collateral was authorized, see U.C.C. § 9-306(2), or where a 
priority rule terminates a secured party's lien, see, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-307(1) 
(awarding priority to most buyers in the ordinary course of business). At 
other times, a secured party will retain an interest in the original collateral, 
but be unable to assert it. This would occur, for example, if the collateral's 
whereabouts were unknown. 
6. Although § 9-306 is functionally similar to § 9-315, there is a concep-
tual difference between the two sections. Under § 9-306(2), a security interest 
continues only in identifiable proceeds, while § 9-315(1)(b) requires that the 
original collateral lose its identity. 
The § 9-306(2) identification requirement can seriously affect the extent to 
which a secured party may claim an interest in the debtor's property. It has 
been particularly troublesome to secured parties when cash proceeds have 
been deposited in a debtor's bank account and commingled with non-proceeds. 
Whether the proceeds remain identifiable has been an issue with which courts, 
see, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504 F.2d 998, 
1001-04 (7th Cir. 1974); National Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Virginia Capital 
Bank, 498 F. Supp.1078, 1081-85 (E.D. Va.1980); C.O. Funk & Sons, Inc. v. Sul-
livan Equip. Inc., 89 Ill. 2d 27, 30-33, 431 N.E.2d 370, 372-73 (1982); Michigan 
Nat'l Bank v. Flowers Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 26 N.C. App. 690, 694-97, 217 
S.E.2d 108, 111-12 (1978); Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. First Am. Bank, 614 P.2d 
1091, 1093-94 (Okla. 1980), and commentators, see, e.g., Henning, Article Nine's 
Treatment of Commingled Cash Proceeds in Non-Insolvency Cases, 35 ARK. L. 
REV. 191, 193-94 (1981); Henson, 'Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 232, 238-41 (1965); Skilton, The Security Party's 
Rights in a Debtor's Bank Account Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 1977 S. ILL. L.J. 120, 122-40, have wrestled. This same question, but 
in a different context, has recently been the subject of a comprehensive report 
by the Law Reform Commission of British Columbia. See LAW REFORM COM-
MISSION OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, REPORT ON COMPETING RIGHTS TO MINGLED 
PROPERTY: TRACING AND THE RULE IN CLAYTON'S CASE (1983). 
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credit, they are grounded in large part on a need for commer-
cial certainty.7 A secured creditor must be able to determine 
whether and to what extent his or her security interest will at-
tach to the debtor's property as well as the risk of being 
subordinated to other claims to that property.8 This desire for 
certainty, perhaps, partially explains the wealth of literature 
engendered by section 9-306. 9 Because of the functional equiva-
lence of sections 9-306 and 9-315, one would expect to find a 
similar interest in section 9-315. Although described as a "com-
plex provision"10 and one of its subsections is characterized as 
"notably obscure,"11 section 9-315 to date successfully has es-
caped detailed analysis.12 This lack of analysis may result from 
a general failure to appreciate the section's wide scope and po-
tential utility. 
Once an appreciation of section 9-315's intended breadth is 
triggered, however, troublesome questions arise regarding its 
application. Because these questions are not answered in sec-
tion 9-315 itself, this section must be analyzed in light of its 
common law origins and the general policies of Article 9. Part 
7. For views regarding the justifications for secured credit, see White, Ef-
ficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 V AND. L. REV. 473, 
476-79 (1984); Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Re-
view of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1981); Jackson & Kronman, 
Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1147-49 
(1979). 
8. The more uncertain a secured party's status, the higher the rate of re-
turn he or she will demand, thus potentially reducing the efficiency of the se-
cured credit system. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 7, at 1149-50. 
9. See supra note 6. 
10. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERsONAL PROPERTY § 31.4, at 
846 (1965). 
11. Id. § 31.5, at 852 (discussing§ 9-315(2)). 
12. The majority of references to § 9-315 are to the priority statement of 
subsection (2), and then only for analogical purposes without much discussion. 
See, e.g., Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 Upon Security 
Interests Created Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 HARV. L. REV. 
1369, 1407-08 (1968) (I.R.S. and secured party should share pro rata when prop-
erty in which the secured party has priority is combined with property in 
which the I.R.S. has priority); Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 
HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1376 (1963) (two purchase money secured parties should 
share pro rata if each interest attached and became perfected at the same 
time); Henson, Priorities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 425, 434 (1966) (two purchase money secured parties should share 
pro rata regardless of time of filing); Payne, Uniform Commercial Code, 1983 
DE'r. C.L. REV. 575, 597 (two purchase money secured parties should share pro 
rata regardless of time of filing); Stone, Allocation of Risk for Products Recall 
Expenditures: A Legislative Proposal, 1975 DE'r. C.L. REV. 1, 26-27 (use of§ 9-
315(2) formula suggested for allocating recall expenditures between manufac-
turer and supplier). 
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I of this Article therefore examines the historical origins of sec-
tion 9-315 through a discussion of the common law doctrines of 
accession, specification, and confusion-property doctrines 
firmly rooted in civil and common law that retain a surprising 
vitality under the Code. Part II explores the drafting history of 
section 9-315, noting trends in earlier drafts that help delineate 
the precise contours of the security interest created. Part III 
analyzes the mechanics of section 9-315 in detail, initially focus-
ing on the cliff erent ways a security interest can attach to a 
product or mass under subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b). It next ex-
plains why a secured party's interest in a section 9-315 product 
should extend to the full amount of the secured debt while an 
interest in a confused mass should be limited to the value of 
the commingled collateral. It then argues that although a pre-
confusion purchase money security interest in goods should 
continue in a confused mass, pre-affixation purchase money sta-
tus should terminate when goods are assembled into a section 
9-315 product. Finally, Part IV examines the applicability and 
application of the priority rule in subsection (2) and explains 
why it should apply only when conflicting interests in the end 
product or mass have each attached under subsection (1). 
I. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF SECTION 9-315 
The concept of title has always been important in resolving 
conflicting claims to property,13 and it is therefore not surpris-
ing that various rules and doctrines regarding its location have 
developed over the years. Section 9-315 was included in the 
Code to deal with three such doctrines-accession, specification, 
and confusion-all rooted in both civil and common law.14 Be-
13. Prior to the Code, many commercial problems were resolved by 
"resorting to the idea of when property or title passed or was to pass." U.C.C. 
§ 2-101 comment. In many situations, the location of title was difficult to 
pinpoint. See 1 K. LLEWELLYN, HEARINGS BEFORE THE NEW.YORK LAW REVI-
SION COMMISSION ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 96 (1954); J. WHITE & 
R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
§ 5-1, at 176 (2d ed. 1980) ("Who had title and what caused title to pass from 
the seller to the buyer were often mysteries to both lawyers and the courts."). 
Perhaps because of this problem, the drafters of the Code attempted to down-
play the importance of location of title. There are situations under the Code, 
however, where location of title is relevant. For example, Article 2 contains a 
title section, § 2-401, and location of title might be critical in some situations. 
See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 2, at 21-26 (location of title will de-
termine whether a buyer takes free of a security interest under§ 9-307(1)). 
14. For a discussion of a subtle difference in how the three doctrines were 
perceived under Roman and common law, see generally Slater, Accessio, 
Specificatio and Confusio: Three Skeletons in the Closet, 37 CAN. BAR REV. 
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cause much of the substance of these "three skeletons in the 
closet"15 retains its vitality in the Code, any analysis of section 
9-315 should begin with an examination of these doctrines' in-
fluence on pre-Code property and security law. 
A. ACCESSION 
Accession occurs when a lesser good, the accession, is 
united with a principal good so as to become an integral part of 
the principal good. As a result of this integration, title to the 
accession passes to the owner of the principal good.16 Because 
597, 597-98 (1959) (under Roman law, accession was a property doctrine 
whereas early common law viewed all three doctrines as lying within the 
realm of tort law). 
15. This phrase is borrowed from Slater, supra note 14. 
16. See, e.g., Messler Acceptance Co. v. Norton Tire Co., 70 So. 2d 360, 361 
(Fla. 1954); Passieu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 58 Ga. App. 691, 692-93, 199 S.E. 775, 
776-77 (1938); Bozeman Mortuary Ass'n v. Fairchild, 253 Ky. 74, 78-80, 68 
S.W.2d 756, 758 (1934). 
Although originated by the Romans, see Lorenzen, Specification in the 
Civil Law, 35 YALE L.J. 29, 29 (1925), the doctrine of accession has long been a 
part of English common law. Blackstone'summarized the doctrine as follows: 
[I]f any given corporeal substance received afterwards an accession by 
natural or by artificial means, as by the growth of vegetables, the 
pregnancy of animals, the embroidering of cloth, or the conversion of 
wood or metal into vessels and utensils, the original owner of the 
thing was intitled [sic] by his right of possession to the property of it 
under such its state of improvement: but if the thing itself, by such 
operation, was changed into a different species, as by making wine, 
oil, or bread, out of another's grapes, olives, or wheat, it belonged to 
the new operator; who was only to make a satisfaction to the former 
proprietor for the materials, which he had so converted. 
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *404-05. 
Under Blackstone's formulation, the process of accession includes at least 
two distinct operations. Accession could occur when one article is attached to 
a different article, or it could occur when a single item is transformed into a 
different item through the labor of a craftsman. Thus the term "accession," 
which simply means "something added," see R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PER-
SONAL PROPERTY § 6.1, at 49 (3d ed. 1975), was a generic term referring to the 
transformation of an object through the "addition" of either property or labor. 
Accession may also occur through natural rather than artificial means, in 
which case the property or labor of a third party would not strictly be in-
volved. It is well settled, for example, that "in the case of domestic animals 
. . . the owner of the mother acquires the ownership of the offspring." Id. In 
addition, "pre-Code law held that a chattel mortgage or conditional sale con-
tract covering an animal also covered automatically the offspring of the collat-
eral." Nickles, Accessions and Accessories Under Pre-Code Law and U.C.C. 
Article 9, 35 ARK. L. REV. 111, 113 n.4 (1981). Whether this continues to be the 
rule under the Code is unclear. The 1962 official text does provide that the 
debtor has no rights "in the young of livestock until they are conceived." 
U.C.C. § 9-204(2)(a). When the debtor acquires rights in the collateral is, how-
ever, not the same question as whether the good is, in fact, collateral. 
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classification of a good as "lesser" or "principal" is often diffi-
cult, and because varying degrees of affixation are possible, it is 
not easy to determine the location of title. When determining 
whether the required integration has occurred, courts have tra-
ditionally considered the extent to which the lesser good is ca-
pable of being readily identified and easily detached from the 
principal good.17 Often the conclusion reached depends upon 
whether and to what extent a detachment will damage either 
good.18 Assuming sufficient integration, title to the whole vests 
Although there appear to be no cases involving this issue, Professor Clark 
seems to suggest that a secured party's claim to livestock acquired by natural 
increase depends upon there being a reference to after-acquired livestock in 
the security agreement. B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 8.4, at 8-17 (1980). This view neces-
sarily assumes that the Code has displaced the common law rule, an assump-
tion far from evident. See Nickles, supra, at 117 n.14 (the Code was never 
meant to displace all common law doctrines); see also U.C.C. § 1-103 (unless 
displaced by the Code, common law principles should supplement Code provi-
sions). 
For purposes of clarity, this Article uses the civil law terms "accession" 
and "specification" to refer to the addition of the property or labor of another 
respectively. Accession refers to "the transfer of title which [takes] place 
when two chattels belonging to different persons [are] combined into a single 
article, as when A's cloth is used to patch B's coat." See Slater, supra note 14, 
at 598. Following the accession, the resulting product is "identified with but 
one of the preexisting articles," Arnold, The Law of Accession of Personal 
Property, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 103, 103 (1922) (emphasis in original), and "title 
to the resulting product goes to the owner of the principal goods," R. BROWN, 
supra, § 6.3, at 52. Specification, on the other hand, 
comprehends the case of one who by his labor and skill, has created a 
new product out of another's article, as where marble is carved into a 
statue or cloth made into a dress. It is frequently referred to as acces-
sion by skill or labor. Here none of the original article is found, and a 
nova species is created. 
Arnold, supra, at 103. 
Because accession and specification are conceptually distinct, this Article 
considers each operation separately. An important similarity between the two 
doctrines, however, is that both operate only when the end product cannot be 
divided. It is for this reason that one party must receive title to the whole 
product. This all or nothing approach is a consequence of the fact that "the 
policy of the law favors absolute ownership in one when a partition is impossi-
ble, rather than a tenancy in common of undivided shares." Note, Accession: 
Power of agent to acquire title by accession, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 119, 123 (1936). 
Compare this reluctance with the judicial willingness to find just such a coten-
ancy when goods have been commingled. See infra notes 60 and 61 and accom-
panying text. 
17. See, e.g., Mossier Acceptance Co. v. Norton Tire Co., 70 So. 2d 360, 361 
(Fla. 1954); Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. Caesar, 214 N.C. 85, 87-88, 197 S.E. 
698, 700 (1938); Frankling Serv. Stations v. Sterling Motor Truck Co., 50 R.I. 
336, 337-39, 147 A. 754, 755-56 (1929); Clark v. Wells, 45 Vt. 4, 7 (1872). 
18. See, e.g., Franklin Serv. Stations v. Sterling Motor Truck Co., 50 R.I. 
336, 338-39, 147 A. 754, 755-56 (1929); Clark v. Wells, 45 Vt. 4, 7 (1872). For an 
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in the party having title to the principal good regardless of the 
circumstances surrounding the affixation.19 
Prior to the Code, the doctrine of accession also operated in 
the arena of secured transactions where it could enlarge or im-
pair a secured party's interest.20 Two basic scenarios presented 
themselves, distinguishable according to the identity of the 
competing claimants, but each involving a claim to the accesso-
rial good by a secured party with an original interest in the 
principal good. One type of situation involved a debtor who af-
fixed his or her own property to the secured party's collateral. 
In such a case, if the attached property became an integral part 
of the original collateral, it too was subject to the secured 
party's lien.21 A more common situation, however, was when 
the competing claimant to the accessorial good was not the 
debtor, but rather the seller of the accessorial good who had re-
tained an interest to secure its purchase price.22 In such a situ-
ation, while the rules theoretically remained the same, the 
result somehow changed. What was a sufficient integration vis-
a-vis the debtor was, for some unknown reason, an insufficient 
integration when the disputants were two secured parties.23 
The focus of many of these early decisions arguably was 
in-depth analysis of the various tests employed to determine whether a suffi-
cient integration has occurred, see Nickles, supra note 16, at 118-36. 
19. It would seem, therefore, "that if A steals B's paint, and with it paints 
A's automobile, both the automobile and the paint will belong to A." R. 
BROWN, supra note 16, § 6.3, at 52. 
20. Although the doctrine is grounded in the concept of title, its applica-
tion did not seem to depend on whether a secured party was said to have "ti-
tle" to or a "lien" on the principal good. See Nickles, supra note 16, at 116 
n.12. 
21. See, e.g., Peoples Loan & Inv. Co. v. Whittle, 205 Ark. 35, 36-37, 166 
S.W.2d 1013, 1013-14 (1942); Purnell v. Fooks, 32 Del. 336, 338-39, 122 A. 901, 
901-02 (1923); Auto Owner's Fin. Co. v. Evirs, 94 N.H. 180, 183, 49 A.2d 507, 
509-10 (1946); Blackwood Tire & Vulcanizing Co. v. Auto Storage Co., 133 
Tenn. 515, 517-21, 182 S.W. 576, 576-77 (1915). 
22. The interest retained was usually title. Prior to the Code, there ex-
isted numerous personal property security devices, the use of each dependent 
on the transaction involved. The conditional sale was used primarily by sellers 
to secure all or a portion of a good's purchase price. Conceptually, it was said 
that the seller retained title to the good until the purchase price had been paid 
in full. This and other pre-Code security devices are treated at length in 1 G. 
GILMORE, supra note 10, §§ 1.1-8.8, at 3-286. 
23. See, e.g., Mossler Acceptance Co. v. Norton Tire Co., 70 So. 2d 360, 361-
62 (Fla. 1954); Passieu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 58 Ga. App. 691, 692-93, 199 S.E. 
775, 776-77 (1938); Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. Pratt Motor Co., 198 Minn. 
259, 261-63, 269 N.W. 464, 465-66 (1936); Havas Used Cars, Inc. v. Lundy, 70 
Nev. 539, 541-42, 276 P.2d 727, 728 (1954); Turner v. Superior Tire Serv., 9 
Tenn. App. 597, 600-01 (1929). 
8 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1 
misplaced, because the issue of whether an accessorial good be-
comes an accession should in no way hinge on the parties' iden-
tity. A person other than the debtor claiming a security 
interest in accessorial goods is irrelevant to the issue of 
whether or not the goods have physically or functionally be-
come an integral part of the principal good.24 To conclude "that 
the tires and tubes become an integral part of the truck, as be-
tween the owner and the holder of the contract retaining title 
to the truck, and that they do not become an integral part of it 
as to the seller of the . . . tires and tubes"25 was recognized by 
one court as, perhaps, not "entirely logical."26 
Today, the pre-Code accession doctrine continues to influ-
ence the law of secured transactions, being only partially sup-
planted by the Code. The Code section that -usually comes to 
mind when discussing accessions is section 9-314.27 That section 
24. Nickles, supra note 16, at 127. 
25. Passieu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 58 Ga. App. 691, 692, 199 S.E. 775, 777 
(1938). 
26. Id. Professor Nickles suggests that such inconsistent results may have 
been a by-product of the pre-Code rule that a secured party's interest can only 
attach to and cannot exceed the debtor's interest in the collateral. See Nickles, 
supra note 16, at 128-33. Under such a rule, "the interest acquired by a prior 
encumbrancer in after-acquired property was generally subject to the same 
limitations and restrictions under which the debtor got the property." Id. at 
128. Although this observation may in part explain the results of the pre-Code 
accession cases, it cannot justify them because the doctrine of accession is anti-
thetical to the notion of a derivative rights doctrine. The latter has the effect 
of preserving pre-existing property interests whereas the former disrupts 
those interests. A more satisfying explanation is that courts were trying to 
reach what they perceived to be an equitable result, recognizing that the con-
cept of sufficient integration is a malleable one. That the sufficiency of inte-
gration must depend, at least in part, on "equity, good conscience and other 
considerations of public policy" was recognized in Passieu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 
58 Ga. App. 691, 692, 199 S.E. 775, 777 (1938). 
In any event, when deciding whether an affixed good is an accession, the 
relevant focus is not on the status of the parties but on the sufficiency of inte-
gration-if the affixed good cannot be easily identified and readily detached 
with a minimum of damage to both goods, it is an accession. See Mixon v. 
Georgia Bank, 154 Ga. App. 32, 32, 267 S.E.2d 483, 484 (1980) (rejecting the 
view that the relationship between the parties controls the accession issue in 
favor of an approach that examines "the relationship that [a] chattel bears to 
another"); see also Nickles, supra note 16, at 134 (the decision under Article 9 
whether goods are accessions "should not be influenced by pre-Code cases in-
volving a third party with an interest in the goods and thus holding inapplica-
ble the doctrine of accession"). 
27. Note that this section only states "when a secured party claiming an 
interest in goods installed in or affixed to other goods is entitled to priority 
over a party with a security interest in the whole." U.C.C. § 9-314 comment. 
It offers no guidance on whether a good is, in fact, an accession. Whether an 
affixed good is an accession is often a threshold question under § 9-314, and, as 
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alters the pre-Code "winner take all" approach by givmg a 
party with a security interest in a good that becomes an acces-
sion the opportunity to retain priority with respect to that good 
over a party with an interest in the whole.28 Further, the party 
with a security interest in the accession is given the right to re-
move it from the principal good upon the debtor's default. 29 
This approach unfortunately effects at least a partial destruc-
tion of the economic integrity of the principal good. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the drafters took an alternative ap-
proach to the problem of accessions in section 9-315-one that 
preserves the economic integrity of the end product while pro-
tecting the competing parties' interests.30 
B. SPECIFICATION 
Specification occurs when a new article is made out of one 
person's chattel through the skill and labor of another, as when 
A's leather is made into shoes by B, or X's grapes are made into 
wine by Y.31 Because this doctrine involves the addition of an-
other's labor and skill, the issue under property law of who pos-
sesses title to the end product depends not, as in the case of a 
purported accession, on the sufficiency of integration, but 
rather on whether a nova species has been created.32 If the 
developed infra notes 117-121 and accompanying text, under § 9-315 as well. 
To make these determinations, one must resort to the common law of 
accession. 
28. See U.C.C. § 9-314(1)-(3). 
29. See U.C.C. § 9-314(4). The accessions secured party must reimburse 
the party with an interest in the whole for any physical damage caused by the 
removal. Id. 
30. See infra notes 117-121 and accompanying text. 
31. See R. BROWN, supra note 16, § 6.2, at 50-51. 
32. See id.; Arnold, supra note 16, at 105; Cross, Another Look at Acces-
sion, 22 Miss. L.J. 138, 138 (1951); Slater, supra note 14, at 597-98. In a suit 
brought by the original owner against the specificator, however, a "location of 
title" determination is not always necessary. It would not be required, for ex-
ample, if the purpose of the suit is to recover conversion damages rather than 
to recapture the good. Instead, the decision to be made is how to apportion the 
present value of the good. In such a case, present value would consist of origi-
nal value, plus the value of the specificator's labors, plus any synergistic in-
crease caused by the combination of these two value components. 
Although much depends upon the equities of the particular case, see Ar-
nold, supra note 16, at 104, two general methods of apportioning present value 
seem to have emerged in such conversion actions. If the original appropriation 
was in good faith, damages are limited to the good's original value. See, e.g., 
Chamberlain v. Collinson, 45 Iowa 429, 434 (1877); Hinman v. Heyderstadt, 32 
Minn. 250, 252, 20 N.W. 155, 156 (1884); Lamoreaux v. Randall, 53 N.D. 697, 
703, 208 N.W. 104, 106 (1926); Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. 291, 296-97 (1861). But 
see Robertson v. Jones, 71 Ill. 405, 407 (1874). If the appropriation can be char-
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specificator has succeeded in creating a new species of good, the 
original owner's interest terminates; if not, the owner of the 
original goods retains title to the end product.33 Although the 
doctrine is easily stated, its application often requires the skills 
of a metaphysician, for the determination of whether a certain 
chemical transformation or physical change has been sufficient 
to shift title to the specificator is fact-specific and inherently 
subjective.34 As one court succinctly noted, "[the authorities] 
have not agreed upon any rule by which it can in all cases be 
ascertained whether this transformation has or has not taken 
place."35 It is, therefore, not surprising to discover that the re-
ported cases paint a picture of "uncertainty, confusion and 
inconsistency. "36 
acterized as culpable, however, recovery is allowed up to the value of the good 
in its improved condition. See, e.g., Sunnyside Coal & Coke Co. v. Reitz, 14 
Ind. App. 478, 485, 39 N.E. 541, 543 (1895); State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 62 
Minn. 99, 102, 64 N.W. 81, 84 (1895); King v. Merriman, 38 Minn. 47, 54, 35 
N.W. 570, 572 (1887); Barnes v. Moore, 199 Va. 227, 232, 98 S.E.2d 683, 686 
(1957). 
33. Often relevant to the doctrine's applicability is the specificator's good 
faith. As one court has observed, a "wilful wrongdoer acquires no property in 
the goods of another, either by the wrongful taking or by any change wrought 
in them by his labor or skill, however great that change may be." Silsbury v. 
McCoon, 3 N.Y. 379, 387 (1850); see also Eaton v. Langley, 65 Ark. 448, 458-59, 
47 S.W. 123, 127 (1898) (considering whether one who converted timber into 
cross ties acted in good faith); McKinnis v. Little Rock, M.R. & T. Ry., 44 Ark. 
210, 211 (1884) ("a willful tresspasser . . . who converts timber into cross ties, 
posts or rails, is not permitted to acquire a right to, or interest in, the material 
he has devoted his labor upon"); Potter v. Mardre, 74 N.C. 36, 40 (1876) ("prop-
erty changed by a change made in its species or substantial form, if made by 
one who was acting in good faith and under an honest belief that the title was 
in him"); Brown v. Sax, 7 Cow. 95, 96-97 (N.Y. 1826) ("[t]he rule, in case of a 
wrongful taking, is that the taker cannot, by any act of his own, acquire title"). 
34. See Arnold, supra note 16, at 105 ("It should be noted that while every 
change of species would result in a change of physical identity, not every loss 
of physical identity would create a new species."). 
35. Eaton v. Langley, 65 Ark. 448, 452, 47 S.W. 123, 124 (1898). For exam-
ple, compare Potter v. Mardre, 74 N.C. 36, 40 (1876) ("The property is changed 
by a change made in its species or substantial form .... ") with Lampton's 
Ex'rs v. Preston's Ex'rs, 24 Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh.) 455, 460 (1829) ("[N]o change of 
mere form could divest the right of the owner of the material, as leather made 
into shoes, cloth into a coat, timber into plank, blocks or shingles; in all which 
cases the material is not altered in its qualities or kind, and can be easily iden-
tified.") (emphasis in original). 
36. Cross, supra note 32, at 139. See, e.g., Riddle v. Driver, 12 Ala. 590, 
591-92 (1847) (wood transformed into charcoal is same species of good); Eaton 
v. Langley, 65 Ark. 448, 455, 47 S.W. 123, 125-26 (1898) (timber transformed 
into cross ties is same species of good); Burris v. Johnson, 24 Ky. (1 J.J. 
Marsh.) 196, 197-98 (1829) (timber transformed into a boat frame is same spe-
cies of good); Lampton's Ex'rs v. Preston's Ex'rs, 24 Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh.) 454, 
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Further complicating matters, some courts have decided 
specification cases by using the theory of relative or compara-
tive value.37 This approach involves comparing the value of the 
original good to that of the altered good. If the value added is 
great enough, a new species is recognized. When employed, 
however, this approach is also plagued by uncertainty, for 
courts disagree on how much added value is "enough."38 The 
cases lead inexorably to the conclusion that "the theory of rela-
tive value is as arbitrary and unsatisfactory as is reliance upon 
the factors of chemical transformation and physical change."39 
467 (1829) (clay transformed into fired brick is a new species of good, but clay 
transformed into unfired brick is the same species of good); Potter v. Mardre, 
74 N.C. 36, 42 (1876) (timber transformed into canoe is a new species of good). 
Such differences in result, although perhaps not justifiable, may be better 
understood by examining the historical roots of the specification doctrine. 
Like that of accession, see supra note 16, the doctrine of specification 
originated in Roman law, and its common law evolution has been influenced 
by civil law notions of property rights. There is a distinction made under the 
civil law, however, that has not been accepted wholesale by common law 
courts. Under Roman law, if the specificator transformed the original good 
into a new item with different physical properties than the original, title to the 
good vested with the specificator. If, however, merely the size or shape of the 
original good were altered, the owner of the original good retained title to the 
end product. See R. BROWN, supra note 16, § 6.2, at 50. This distinction appar-
ently has not been rigorously maintained in the common law. As Professor 
Brown has noted: 
Id. 
[the Roman] doctrine ... is artificial and unconcerned with an ethical 
determination of the problem it purports to solve. It is arbitrary and 
unjust to hold that he who makes wine from another's grapes ac-
quires title to the resulting product, while he who carves a work of 
art from another's stone does not. From the standpoint of justice the 
law cannot ignore the proportion in which the materials of one and 
the labor of another contribute to the value of the result product. 
Because of these types of concerns, common law courts have looked more 
kindly than civil law courts on the innocent specificator who effects only a 
change in the size and shape of the original goods. See, e.g., Wetherbee v. 
Green, 22 Mich. 311, 320 (1871) (innocent trespasser who converted lumber 
into barrel hoops acquired title to the new goods). The extent to which this 
view has supplanted the Roman law distinction is unclear, because notions of 
fault, see supra note 33, and comparative value, see infra note 38 and accompa-
nying text, often play a major role in specification cases. See generally R. 
BROWN, supra note 16, § 6.2, at 50-53 (modern specification doctrine is "arbi-
trary and uncertain"). 
37. See cases cited infra note 38. 
38. See, e.g., Eaton v. Langley, 65 Ark. 448, 457, 47 S.W. 123, 126-27 (1898) 
(increment of six times original value held insufficient); Wetherbee v. Green, 
22 Mich. 311, 320 (1871) (increment of twenty-eight times original value held 
sufficient); Louis Werner Stove Co. v. Pickering, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 632, 635-36, 
119 S.W. 333, 334-35 (1909) (increment of three times original value held 
sufficient). 
39. Cross, supra note 32, at 145. 
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The impact of the specification doctrine on the pre-Code 
rights of secured parties is not altogether clear. In many early 
opinions, courts appear to be grappling with the problem of 
how to apply the doctrine to a secured credit system grounded 
on distinct policy concerns. This resulted in a body of case law 
in which many decisions were controlled by factors somewhat 
unrelated to traditional specification doctrine.40 
It would seem that the doctrine would be relevant in a 
wide variety of cases where work is performed on collateral-
for example, the manufacturing of an item from materials sub-
ject to a lien. In such a situation, the question whether the se-
cured party's interest will continue in the new product and 
embrace the increased value derived from the labor of the 
mortgagor would seem to require a specification analysis. 
Although not explicitly using the term "specification,'' a 
number of courts faced with such situations have used language 
indicating the need for the same type of nova species inquiry 
used in specification cases not involving security interests.41 
For example, the court in Netzorg v. National Supply Co. 42 
observed: 
It is not to be doubted that a mortgage placed upon some one article, 
will cover that article as subsequently changed, provided the integrity 
of the article remains. Precisely as with a mortgage upon a house and 
lot, where the mortgage will remain a lien upon the house although 
painted and improved during the time of the existence of the mort-
gage and before it is foreclosed. 43 
Many of the early opinions justified such a nova species in-
quiry by focusing on the nature of the secured credit system it-
self. One such justification was to preserve the pre-Code filing 
system as a source of information regarding a secured party's 
claim..44 If the filed description of the collateral was no longer 
40. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text. 
41. See, e.g., Comins v. Newton, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 518, 518 (1865); Crosby 
v. Baker, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 295, 298 (1863); Harding v. Coburn, 53 Mass. (12 
Met.) 333, 342-43 (1847). 
42. 28 Ohio C.C. Dec. 112 (1905). 
43. Id. at 118 (emphasis added). 
44. See, e.g., Perry v. Pettingill, 33 N.H. 433, 436 (1856). The Perry court, 
after deciding that, as against the mortgagor, the mortgagee's security interest 
continues regardless of how the good changes, stated: 
In case materials were mortgaged by a particular description, and 
with the assent of the mortgagee were manufactured into articles not 
answering to that description, and so changed that with reasonable 
diligence a creditor could not know that they were the same, if he 
should, without actual notice of the claim under the mortgage, attach 
them for the debt of the mortgagor, it would deserve serious attention 
whether, under our statute requiring mortgages of personal property 
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descriptive of the new good, the filing would no longer be per-
forming its assigned function. Another apparent rationale was 
the resistance of common law courts to recognize the ability to 
grant in praesenti a lien on property not then owned.45 If the 
new good were a different species from the original, it would 
theoretically follow that it was not in existence when the secur-
ity interest was first given. In many jurisdictions, it would, 
therefore, be an "after-acquired" good not subject to the lien of 
the secured party without the execution of a supplemental 
mortgage.46 
A final concern in pre-Code specification cases, most evi-
dent when the original security interest was in raw materials, 
was whether the parties had actually intended the security in-
terest to encompass the finished product. Since the source of 
the secured party's interest was contractual, it was appropriate 
to determine the terms of the contract. In the absence of lan-
guage in the mortgage clearly indicating an intent to include 
the finished product or transformed good, courts, by focusing 
on the degree of change, would have been doing no more than 
establishing a framework for determining and protecting the 
expectations of the parties.47 
to be registered, the mortgagee could hold against the attaching 
creditor. 
Id.; see al.so Dehority v. Paxson, 97 Ind. 253, 259 (1884) ("such furniture was 
sufficiently described by the terms of the mortgage"); Comins v. Newton, 92 
Mass. (10 Allen) 518, 519 (1865) ("changes thus made did not so far destroy its 
identity as to make it substantially incapable of identification"). 
45. For a discussion of security interests in after-acquired property, see 1 
G. GILMORE, supra note 10, §§ 2.3-2.5, at 27-47; Cohen & Gerber, The .A,fter-Ac-
quired Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1939). 
46. One escape from limitations placed upon the "after-acquired property" 
clause was the doctrine of "potential existence." It would permit "the sale or 
encumbrance of future personal property having a so-called potential exist-
ence arising from the fact that the processes of creation have already begun, 
with the limitation that the basic substance which yields the increment must 
be owned by the vendor or mortgagor." Cohen and Gerber, supra note 45, at 
635-36. This doctrine was probably the cause of the court's conclusion in Ex 
parte Ames, 1 Fed. Cas. 746, 749 (D. Mass. 1871) (No. 323), that "[i]f any loco-
motives were in course of manufacture when the mortgage was given, the ad-
ditions to them would pass by accretion . . . even if the materials were not 
included in the mortgage . . . . But ... a mere mortgage of materials would 
not convey new articles made out of those materials." For two cases holding 
that the improved good was not after-acquired, see Dehority v. Paxson, 97 Ind. 
253, 259 (1884) and Putnam v. Cushing, 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 334, 335-36 (1858). 
47. For example, because of language in the mortgage explicitly including 
the product of collateral, the court in Dunning v. Stearns, 9 Barb. 630 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1850) had no difficulty finding that 
[i]t was clearly the intention of the parties to the agreement to create 
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Although the exact role specification played in the pre-
Code law of secured transactions is thus unclear, the situations 
ostensibly covered by the doctrine now lie within the domain of 
section 9-315. To some degree the law has been clarified, but as 
will be seen,48 important problems persist. 
C. CONFUSION 
A third doctrine, historically and functionally related to ac-
cession and specification, but distinct from either, is confu-
sion.49 A confusion of goods occurs whenever "there has been 
such an inter-mixture of goods owned by different persons, that 
the property of each can no longer be distinguished."5° Confu-
sion can occur in two ways. Similar types of goods belonging to 
different persons can be commingled, resulting in a confused 
mass, as when A's wheat is mixed with the same type of wheat 
belonging to B.51 Another type of confusion occurs when dif-
ferent types of goods are commingled to form a confused prod-
uct, as where X's eggs are mixed with Y's flour and Z's sugar to 
form a cake mix. 
In the case of a confused mass, although each unit of the 
newly created mass can no longer be identified as belonging to 
a particular person,52 each retains its independent physical 
a lien, as well upon the potash to be manufactured as upon the arti-
cles out of which it should be made . . . . It was an agreement to hy-
pothecate the products of the particular property pledged, and the 
lien would attach upon the new article as fast as it came into 
existence. 
Id. at 633-34; see also Dehority v. Paxson, 97 Ind. 253, 259 (1884) ("It was a 
mortgage . . . with a sufficient manifestation . . . that it should hold the man-
ufactured articles .... "); Frank v. Playter, 73 Mo. 672, 674 (1881) (''This 
mortgage covered all spelter made after said date from ore then on 
hand .... "). 
48. See infra notes 134-163 and 184-197 and accompanying text. 
49. The doctrine of confusion also dates from the days of Justinian. Un-
like the common law, however, the civil law has always maintained a distinc-
tion between a confusion of things liquid and those not liquid, referring to the 
former as confusio and the latter as commixtio. See Arnold, Confusion, 23 
COLUM. L. REV. 235, 235-36 (1923). 
50. R. BROWN, supra note 16, § 6.8, at 62 (citing Hesseltine v. Stockwell, 30 
Me. 237 (1849) ). 
51. A confused mass may be composed of fungible or non-fungible goods. 
For example, if A's wheat were of different color and quality than B's, com-
mingling would result in a confused mass of non-fungible goods. Such subtle 
distinctions can be important when determining A or B's title to the wheat. 
See infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text. 
52. If this were not the case, there would be no confusion. Thus, not 
every intermixture of goods will result in confusion. There will be no 
confusion 
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identity. This differs from accession and specification since 
those doctrines require, to some extent, a change in or loss of a 
good's independent existence. It is essentially this difference 
that accounts for what is often a different approach to the ques-
tion of title. When similar goods have been commingled, the 
resultant mass is usually capable of physical division and distri-
bution to each of the contributing owners, whereas in the case 
of specification and accession, the physical integrity of the end 
good precludes its division. Thus, although an all-or-nothing ti-
tle approach is preferable in the latter situation, it can be and 
often is avoided in the former. 
Because a confusion of goods will occur only when the con-
stituent parts can no longer be identified as belonging to a par-
ticular person, it would naturally follow that the goods involved 
are usually fungible, and of equal quality and value.53 In that 
case, if the relative contribution of each owner is known, there 
is no reason why each should not be entitled to an aliquot part. 
Accordingly, each contributor will be allowed to retain title to 
his or her proportionate share regardless of fault.54 
as long as the property of the respective owners can be identified and 
returned. . . . Each owner retains his right and title to his separate 
goods, and the only task is the mechanical one of ascertaining and 
separating them. . . . There is no confusion if those who are familiar 
with the property in question can identify and separate the goods of 
the respective owners. 
R. BROWN, supra note 16, § 6.8, at 62; see al,so Banque de France v. Chase Nat'l 
Bank, 60 F.2d 703, 706 (2d Cir. 1932) ("where it is possible to distinguish the 
goods by their appearance or by their marks, there is no confusion"); Finance 
Co. v. Lowry, 36 Ga. App. 337, 339, 136 S.E. 475, 476 (1927) ("There was no con-
fusion here of the goods themselves, since they consisted of separate and dis-
tinct articles."); Smith v. Armstrong, 118 Mont. 290, 297, 166 P.2d 793, 796 
(1946) ("this doctrine has no application to horses or other property that can_ 
be readily identified"), aff'd as modified, 121 Mont. 377, 198 P.2d 795 (1948); 
Robinson v. Holt, 39 N.H. 557, 563 (1859) ("If the goods of several intermingled 
can be easily distinguished and separated, no change of property takes place, 
and each party may lay claim to his own."). 
53. R. BROWN, supra note 16, § 6.8, at 62; see supra note 51. 
54. Even where the confusion is the result of fraud or intentional wrong-
doing by one of the parties, there will be no forfeiture if the relative contribu-
tions of each owner are known. This approach characterized the Supreme 
Court's opinion in The Idaho, 93 U.S. 575 (1876). The Court there said: 
But all the authorities agree, that if a man wilfully and wrongfully 
mixes his own goods with those of another owner, so as to render 
them undistinguishable, he will not be entitled to his proportion, or 
any part, of the property. Certainly not, unless the goods of both own-
ers are of the same quality and value. 
Id. at 585-86 (emphasis added); see al,so Vest v. Bond Bros. 223 Ala. 552, 553, 
137 So. 392, 393 (1931) ("if goods of the same kind and value are intermingled, 
so that the party not at fault may be protected by giving him an aliquot part of 
16 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1 
A different result occurs if a proportionate separation of 
the goods is impossible. Such would be the case if the intermix-
ture is "of goods of different kinds or qualities, or where the 
amounts contributed by the respective parties are unknown."55 
Because the contributors in such situations cannot be returned 
to the pre-confusion status quo, courts have generally decided 
title disputes by focusing on the cause of the confusion.56 If the 
mixture is made by consent of the parties,57 by natural causes,58 
or by a third party,59 the owners become tenants in common of 
the whole, this is the measure of his right"); In re Assignment of Thompson, 
164 Iowa 20, 29, 145 N.W. 76, 80 (1914) ("there is no forfeiture in case of a 
fraudulent intermixture, when the goods intermixed are of equal value"); Hes-
seltine v. Stockwell, 30 Me. 237, 242 (1849) (The admixture "might have been 
of such a character, the logs being of equal value, that the plaintiff would have 
been entitled to recover . . . such proportion . . . as the logs cut upon his land 
bore to the whole number."); Page v. Jones, 26 N.M. 195, 199, 190 P. 541, 542 
(1920) ("harsh rules are not generally applied where the confused goods, 
though indistinguishable, are of equal and uniform value"); Brown v. Bacon, 
63 Tex. 595, 599 (1885) ("No change of ownership will take place if the goods 
can be easily distinguished and separated .... "); Farrow v. Farrow, 238 
S.W.2d 255, 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) ("if the goods are of the same nature and 
value and the portion of each owner is known ... then each owner may claim 
his aliquot part"); St. Paul Boom Co. v. Kemp, 125 Wis. 138, 145-46, 103 N.W. 
259, 261 (1905) ("To operate such a forfeiture it must appear that the lumber 
manufactured out of the respondent's and that of appellant with which it was 
mixed were so different in description, quality, and value that the whole mass 
could not be ratably apportioned .... "). 
55. R. BROWN, supra note 16, § 6.11, at 66. The result of such a commin-
gling would be either a confused product, a confused non-fungible mass, or a 
confused fungible mass with the amount of each party's contribution 
unknown. 
56. One court observed that: 
four cases may arise in which there may be a confusion of rights in-
volved in the confusion of goods: (1) Where the mixture is made by 
consent of the parties. (2) Where it arises from the willful! or tortious 
conduct of one of the parties. (3) Where it is made by unintentional 
mistake. (4) Where it is the result of inevitable accident. 
In re Thompson, 164 Iowa 20, 29, 145 N.W. 76, 79 (1914). 
57. See, e.g., Kinney v. Cullman County Farm Bureau, 217 Ala. 569, 570, 
117 So. 189, 190 (1928); Drudge v. Leitner, 18 Ind. App. 694, 695-96, 49 N.E. 34, 
35 (1898); In re Thompson, 164 Iowa 20, 28-29, 145 N.W. 76, 79 (1914); Jennings-
Heywood Oil Syndicate v. Houssiere-Latuelle Oil Co., 127 La. 971, 996, 54 So. 
318, 326 (1911); Ayre v. Hixson, 53 Or. 19, 33, 98 P. 515, 520 (1908); Trustees of 
Ashland Lodge v. Williams, 100 Wis. 223, 224, 75 N.W. 954, 955 (1898); Edwards 
v. Willson, 30 Wyo. 275, 281, 219 P. 233, 234 (1923). 
58. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Monarch Refrig. Co., 277 Ill. 326, 327-28, 115 N.E. 
534, 534 (1917). 
59. See, e.g., Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Taylor, 186 Ark. 284, 287, 53 S.W.2d 
428, 429 (1932); Johnson v. Covey, 1 Utah 2d 180, 181, 264 P.2d 283, 283 (1953); 
Manti City Sav. Bank v. Peterson, 33 Utah 209, 211-12, 93 P. 566, 566-67 (1908). 
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the product or mass,60 and in the absence of contrary evidence, 
the shares of each will be equal.61 If, however, the confusion is 
caused by a party with wrongful or fraudulent intent, the 
wrongdoer will forfeit his or her interest in the mass or prod-
uct, and title will vest exclusively in the innocent party.62 
Where the commingling occurs through the simple negligence 
of one of the parties, most courts have declared the innocent 
party to be the owner of the whole;63 others, however, have 
sought to preserve the negligent party's interest.64 
It thus appears that the "excellently named doctrine of· 
confusion"65 is not so much a matter of substantive law as it is a 
rule of evidence.66 If there has been adequate proof of commin-
60. See Trustees of Ashland Lodge v. Williams, 100 Wis. 223, 226, 75 N.W. 
954, 955 (1898). Where fungible goods are delivered to a warehouseman, this 
result is codified in U.C.C. § 7-207(2) which provides that "[fjungible goods so 
commingled are owned in common by the persons entitled thereto." 
61. See, e.g., Van Liew v. Van Liew, 36 N.J. Eq. 637, 642-43 (1883) ("Where 
two persons hold either real or personal estate in joint tenancy or in common, 
the presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is that they hold 
in equal shares or moieties."). 
62. See, e.g., The Idaho, 93 U.S. 575, 586 (1876); Hardy v. Hardy, 235 F. 
Supp. 208, 211-12 (D.D.C. 1964); Lightner Mining Co. v. Lane, 161 Cal. 689, 708, 
120 P. 771, 779 (1912); Little Pittsburg Consol. Mining Co. v. Little Chief Con-
sol. Mining Co., 11 Colo. 223, 230, 17 P. 760, 763 (1888); Ontario Livestock 
Comm'n Co. v. Flynn, 256 Iowa 116, 125-26, 126 N.W.2d 362, 368 (1964); Allis 
Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Security Elevator Co., 140 Kan. 580, 582, 38 P.2d 138, 140 
(1934). 
Interestingly, this is not the civil law approach. If the intermixture 
was wilfully made without mutual consent, then the civil law gave 
the whole to him who made the intermixture, and compelled him to 
make satisfaction in damages to the other party for what he had 
lost. The common law, with more policy and justice, to guard 
against fraud, gave the entire property, without any account, to him 
whose property was originally invaded, and its distinct character 
destroyed. 
2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *364. 
63. See, e.g., Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Mulholland, 228 Mass. 152, 157, 117 
N.E. 46, 48 (1917); Ayre v. Hixson, 53 Or. 19, 32, 98 P. 515, 519 (1908); Weaver v. 
R.L. Neal & Co., 61 W. Va. 57, 61, 55 S.E. 909, 910 (1906). 
64. See, e.g., Claflin v. Continental Jersey Works, 85 Ga. 27, 46, 11 S.E. 721, 
723-24 (1890); International Lumber Co. v. Bradley Timber Ry. & Supply Co., 
132 Minn. 155, 158, 156 N.W. 274, 275 (1916). Many of these cases have been 
criticized for failing to enunciate a clear standard for determining how the re-
spective interests are to be apportioned. See R. BROWN, supra note 16, § 6.12, 
at 70. 
65. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 10, § 31.2, at 841. 
66. See Holloway Seed Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 92 Tex. 187, 191, 47 S.W. 95, 
97, TTWdified, 92 Tex. 194, 47 S.W. 516 (1898). There the court explained: 
The rule as to the confusion of goods is merely a rule of evidence. 
The wrongful mingling of one's own goods with those of another, 
when the question of identification of the property arises, throws 
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gling, the burden of establishing the quantity and quality of the 
respective contributions will be on the party most responsible 
for the confusion. Only in the absence of such evidence will ti-
tle to the entirety vest in the innocent party. Such an approach 
is attractive because it protects the innocent party only to the 
extent required.67 Neither party receives an unnecessary wind-
fall nor suffers an unnecessary loss. 
This judicial bias against forfeiture is also apparent in early 
confusion cases in the secured transactions context. The major-
ity of these cases deal with confused masses, created where 
property subject to a security interest had been confused with 
similar unencumbered property belonging to the debtor or a 
third party. As in the cases not involving security interests 
when division of the mass was possible, forfeiture was avoided 
if the party bearing the identification burden could prove the 
proportionate contributions of the competing claimants.68 
Which party bore this burden depended on the identity of the 
Id. 
upon the wrongdoer the burden of pointing out his own goods, and, if 
this cannot be done, he must bear the loss which results from it. It is 
but an application of the principle that all things are presumed 
against the spoliator; that is to say, against one who wrongfully de-
stroys or suppresses evidence. 
67. See Brown v. Bacon, 63 Tex. 595, 598 (1885) ("The doctrine of confu-
sion is extended no further than necessity requires."). 
68. For cases in which a confused mass was proportionately divided be-
tween a secured party and another claimant, see Mahoney v. Citizen's Nat'l 
Bank, 47 Idaho 24, 271 P. 935 (1928) (secured party v. secured party); Clay, 
Robinson & Co. v. Larson, 125 Minn. 271, 146 N.W. 1095 (1914) (secured party 
v. secured party); D.M. Osborne & Co. v. Cargill Elevator Co., 62 Minn. 400, 64 
N.W. 1135 (1895) (secured party v. debtor's vendee); Horne v. Hanson, 68 N.H. 
201, 44 A. 292 (1895) (secured party v. debtor's vendee); Colley v. H.L. Edwards 
,& Co., 258 S.W. 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (secured party v. debtor's vendee); 
Belcher v. Cassidy Bros. Live-Stock Comm'n Co., 26 Tex. Civ. App. 60, 62 S.W. 
924 (1901) (secured party v. secured party); Mittenthal v. Reigel, 31 S.W. 87 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1895) (secured party v. debtor's vendee). 
There are several cases, however, where the entire confused mass was 
awarded to one of the claimants. Such forfeiture occasionally resulted when 
the party bearing the identification burden was unable to prove the value of 
his or her contribution to a fungible mass. See, e.g., Kreth v. Rogers, 101 N.C. 
263, 272, 7 S.E. 682, 686 (1888). In other cases, the entire mass was awarded to 
one claimant without mention of whether a proportionate division was possi-
ble. Perhaps these cases would have been decided differently if division had 
been possible. See, e.g., Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Security Elevator Co., 140 
Kan. 580, 38 P.2d 138 (1934) (secured party v. debtor's vendee-mass awarded 
to secured party); First Nat'l Bank v. Lindenstruth, 79 Md. 136, 28 A. 807 
(1894) (secured party v. lien creditor-mass awarded to lien creditor); Williard 
v. Rice, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 493 (1846) (secured party v. debtor-mass awarded 
to secured party). 
1985] UCC SECTION 9-315 19 
party opposing the secured party and the relative fault of each 
contributor.69 
The simplest case was one involving only a secured party 
and the debtor and a mingling of the secured property with 
similar property belonging to the latter.70 As one might expect, 
the courts placed the identification burden on the debtor.71 For 
example, in Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Security Ele-
vator Co., 72 the court recognized: 
It would be manifestly unfair to hold that a farmer might free the 
wheat [he raised] of a lien held by a third party by mingling it with 
wheat on which there was no lien. If this were held to be the rule, 
then an unscrupulous debtor would never have his goods so that a 
chattel mortgage could be made effective. The corollary of this would 
be that no one would lend money on chattels which could be easily 
confused with other goods.73 
The results were less certain when the claimant opposing 
the secured party was not the commingling debtor. In most 
cases, such a claimant fell into one of two general categories.74 
The ·first category consisted of parties claiming a pre-confusion 
interest in property not originally subject to the secured party's 
69. The term "fault" as used herein should not be read as including only 
active wrongdoing. It is also meant to include any breach of contract and non-
feasance by one with knowledge of the commingling and the power to stop it. 
70. Such cases were often the necessary consequence of the pre-Code an-
tipathy to after-acquired property clauses. See supra notes 45-46 and accompa-
nying text. If the original collateral was inventory, it would inevitably be 
commingled with later-acquired inventory not, at first, subject to the secured 
party's lien. Consequently, it was impossible for the secured party to identify 
the mortgaged stock. For cases involving this fact pattern when the party op-
posing the secured party is or is not the debtor, see In re Thompson, 164 Iowa 
20, 145 N.W. 76 (1914) (secured party v. assignee for the benefit of creditors); 
Rosenberg v. Thompson, 8 S.W. 895 (Ky. Ct. App. 1888) (secured party v. as-
signee for the benefit of creditors); First Nat'l Bank v. Lindenstruth, 79 Md. 
136, 28 A. 807 (1894) (secured party v. lien creditor); Wellock v. Cowan, 246 
Mich. 45, 224 N.W. 413 (1929) (secured party v. debtor). 
71. See, e.g., Wilson v. Windham, 213 Ala. 31, 32, 104 So. 232, 233 (1925); 
Gibson v. Mcintire, 110 Iowa 417, 421-22, 81 N.W. 699, 701 (1900); Wellock v. 
Cowan, 246 Mich. 45, 48, 224 N.W. 413, 414-15 (1929). 
72. 140 Kan. 580, 38 P.2d 138 (1934). 
73. Id. at 581, 38 P.2d at 139. An interesting variation of the usual secured 
party v. debtor case would occur if the mingling were done by a secured party 
to whom goods had been pledged. In that case, the debtor should be entitled 
to recover the mass unless the secured party could identify his or her own 
goods. 
74. A debtor's vendee who subsequently mingles his or her own property 
with the mortgaged property fits neither category. The burden of identifica-
tion is usually on the vendee in such a case. See, e.g., Fuller v. Paige, 26 ill. 
358, 360 (1861); Gibson v. Mcintire, 110 Iowa 417, 422, 81 N.W. 699, 701 (1900). 
20 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1 
lien.75 Although the courts did not always attribute the same 
significance to the same facts, 76 they did, in these cases, consist-
ently direct their attention to the question of fault. Unless the 
parties were equally innocent, the burden of identification, and 
therefore the risk of forfeiture, was placed on the more blame-
worthy claimant.77 
The second category of non-debtor claimants consisted of 
parties who claimed a post-confusion interest in the entire 
mass.78 When this type of claimant was involved, the results 
were inconsistent. When allocating the burden of identifica-
tion, some courts thought fault significant79 whereas others did 
75. This first category would consist of third party owners of goods min-
gled with the mortgaged goods, as well as other secured parties with liens on 
separate, but similar, property of the debtor that subsequently becomes min-
gled with the property subject to the first lien. 
76. In Kreth v. Rogers, 101 N.C. 263, 272, 7 S.E. 682, 686 (1888), a case in-
volving the commingling of goods subject to separate liens, the burden of iden-
tification was placed on the secured party who was later in time because that 
party was on notice of the prior lien and of the possibility that the collateral 
would be commingled. A different approach, however, was taken in Belcher v. 
Cassidy Bros. Live-Stock Comm'n Co., 26 Tex. Civ. App. 60, 64, 62 S.W. 924, 
926 (1901). There the court concluded that "the mortgagees here are equally 
innocent of intentional wrong, and neither should be given advantage in equity 
over the other." Id. at 64, 62 S.W. at 926. No mention was made of the fact 
that the second secured party had at least constructive notice of the first lien. 
One possible explanation for the court's willingness to treat the two parties 
equally is that their proportionate interests in the mass were easily ascertain-
able and no real significance would attach to a particular allocation of the bur-
den of identification. See id. at 64-65, 62 S.W. at 926. 
77. See, e.g., Loupee v. Michigan Cent. R.R. Co., 243 Mich. 144, 150-51, 219 
N.W. 727, 729 (1928) (burden on third party owner because aware of commin-
gling); Clay, Robinson & Co. v. Larson, 125 Minn. 271, 274, 146 N.W.1095, 1097 
(1914) (secured parties equally innocent so neither received an advantage over 
the other); Kreth v. Rogers, 101 N.C. 263, 272, 7 S.E. 682, 686 (1888) (burden on 
secured party who was second in time because that party was on notice of first 
lien); Wells v. Batts, 112 N.C. 283, 291-92, 17 S.E. 417, 419 (1893) (burden on 
third party owner because aware of commingling); Belcher v. Cassidy Bros. 
Live-Stock Comm'n Co., 26 Tex. Civ. App. 60, 64, 62 S.W. 924, 926 (1901) (se-
cured parties equally innocent so neither received an advantage over the 
other). A similar policy decision to provide equal treatment to equally inno-
cent parties can be found in U.C.C. § 7-207, which provides that when there 
has been an overissuance of warehouse receipts the loss is shared by all the 
owners in common. 
78. This second category would consist of parties who purchased the con-
fused mass from the debtor, as well as creditors of the debtor who assert an 
interest in the whole. 
79. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 164 Iowa 20, 30, 145 N.W. 76, 80 (1914) (se-
cured party v. assignee for the benefit of creditors-burden on secured party 
because aware of commingling); Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Security Elevator 
Co., 140 Kan. 580, 581-83, 38 P.2d 138, 139-40 (1934) (secured party v. debtor's 
vendee-because secured party was without notice of commingling and vendee 
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not.Bo Finally, there are some cases in which the identification 
issue was completely ignored because the relative shares of 
each party could be easily ascertained.Bl 
As the foregoing illustrates, the pre-Code status of secured 
parties with interests in goods whose identity was lost through 
commingling was uncertain. Much depended upon the facts of 
the particular case. Because of this, a secured party with an in-
terest in collateral capable of being confused with similar prop-
erty always ran the risk of losing priority when it was most 
needed. This was a risk the drafters of the Code sought to min-
imize in section 9-315. 
II. THE DRAFTING HISTORY OF SECTION 9-315 
The history of Article 9 leaves little doubt that its drafters 
recognized that no statute regulating security interests in per-
sonal property could be considered comprehensive without ad-
dressing those situations within the purview of the doctrines of 
accession, specification, and confusion. As early as the 1948 
draft of the Code, that recognition prompted a slow process of 
evolution ending, at least temporarily, with what is now section 
9-315. "Intermingling and Processing of Inventory Subject to 
Lien," section 315 of that early draft, provided: 
(1) When identification or segregation of inventory subject to an 
inventory lien disappears by commingling processing or otherwise 
with the acquiescence of the financer, the lien is lost. 
(2) When identification or segregation disappears without ac-
quiescense of the financer, the financer loses the specific inventory 
lien but is entitled to a general inventory lien on the resulting mass to 
the extent the rights under any other perfected general inventory lien 
was on notice of lien, vendee lost; the court did not indicate whether vendee 
could avoid forfeiture by identifying secured party's interest in the mass); Ro-
senberg v. Thompson, 8 S.W. 895, 896 (Ky. 1888) (secured party v. assignee for 
the benefit of creditors-burden on secured party because aware of commin-
gling); Ayre v. Hixson, 53 Or. 19, 29, 98 P. 515, 518 (1908) (secured party v. 
debtor's vendee-burden on vendee because on notice of lien). 
80. See, e.g., Thomas Roberts & Co. v. Robinson, 141 Md. 37, 54, 118 A. 198, 
204 (1922) (secured party v. commission merchant with lien-secured party 
lost; the court did not indicate whether the secured party could have avoided 
forfeiture by identifying each party's interest); D.M. Osborne & Co. v. Cargill 
Elevator Co., 62 Minn. 400, 402, 64 N.W. 1135, 1136 (1895) (secured party v. 
debtor's vendee-secured party lost. The court did not indicate whether the 
secured party could have avoided forfeiture by identifying each party's 
interest). 
81. See, e.g., Horne v. Hansen, 68 N.H. 201, 203, 44 A. 292, 293 (1894) (se-
cured party v. debtor's vendee); Colley v. H.L. Edwards & Co., 258 S.W. 191, 
191-92 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (secured party v. debtor's vendee); Mittenthal v. 
Heigel, 31 S.W. 87, 87 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895) (secured party v. debtor's vendee). 
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are not affected.82 
Several aspects of this section merit brief mention. First, the 
continuation of a secured party's lien depends on that party's 
own behavior. The section is thus grounded in fault and remi-
niscent of the pre-Code law of confusion in many jurisdictions. 
Unlike that law, however, this section attaches no relevance to 
the identity or comparative fault of the competing claimant.83 
Another aspect of note is that no provision is made for par-
titioning a confused mass if the extent of the secured party's in-
terest can be determined. Finally, although subsection (2) is 
somewhat ambiguous, it apparently contains a priority state-
ment. The lien of the secured party will always be subordinate 
to any competing security interest in the mass, no mention is 
made of a product, that is not dependent for its existence on 
section 315. 
A further measure of protection for a secured party was 
added in the September 1949 version of the Code. A new sub-
section (1) was incorporated into what was to become section 8-
410, creating an exception to the general rule that a secured 
party's acquiescence in the collateral's loss of identity results in 
a loss of lien.84 It provided that "[w]hen goods subject to a se-
curity interest become part of a fungible mass, the security in-
82. U.C.C. § 315 (Tent. Draft No. 2, Article VII, Aug. 6, 1948). 
83. One possible explanation for this one-sided focus is that the drafters 
were still having difficulty shedding the effects of the landmark case of Bene-
dict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925). There the Supreme Court held that "a 
transfer of property which reserves to the transferor the right to dispose of 
the same, or to apply the proceeds thereof, for his own uses is, as to creditors, 
fraudulent in law and void." Id. at 360. Although the case was decided under 
New York law and involved accounts receivable financing, other courts readily 
accepted it as a rule of general applicability. See, e.g., McCance v. D.A. 
Schulte, Inc., 91 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 744 (1937). The 
drafters of Article 9 took a contrary position in § 9-205, which provides that 
"[a] security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors by reason of 
liberty in the debtor to use, commingle or dispose of all or part of the collat-
eral." Although formally rejecting the rule of Benedict, the drafters neverthe-
less may have wanted to encourage creditors to monitor their debtors' 
activities. U.C.C. § 315 (Art. VII, 1948 draft) would certainly have had that ef-
fect. For a relatively recent discussion of Benedict, see Gilmore, The Good 
Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Re-
pentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 621-27 (1981). It will no doubt surprise 
some to read Professor Gilmore's conclusion that "the substance of the rule in 
Benedict should have been preserved." Id. at 627. 
84. The drafters provided some idea of what they meant by "acquies-
cence" in the second comment to § 8-410, which states "[a] lender's 'acquies-
cence' may be by affirmative act or may be inferred from the nature of the 
transaction (as in the case of inventory held for processing) or from his knowl-
edge of a continuing course of conduct by a borrower, despite contrary provi-
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terest continues on an undivided share of the mass."85 
Although no reason was given for this exception, the most 
likely explanation was simply that it would often be unreasona-
ble to require the debtor to segregate those fungible goods that 
are subject to a particular security interest from those which 
are not. If not segregated, then a loss of identity is inevitable. 
Without an exception to the general acquiescence rule, it would 
be unlikely that any creditor would be willing to accept a secur-
ity interest in only a portion of a debtor's fungible goods.86 Ar-
guably, the most important feature of section 8-410(1), however, 
was the absence of any attempt by the drafters to improve the 
secured party's pre-Code status. Upon the debtor's default, the 
creditor would only be entitled to claim a "share" of the mass. 
This anti-forfeiture point of view echoes pre-Code practice. 
Section 8-410 was short-lived, being replaced by section 8-
314 of the October 1949 draft.87 This section contained a major 
change from the previous drafts. Although a secured party's 
acquiescence remained a relevant consideration, it did not nec-
essarily preclude the lien's continuation. Even if a secured 
party acquiesced in the collateral's loss of identity, that party's 
interest in the collateral continued in a product or mass "if the 
security agreement so provides,"88 and continued perfected in a 
product "if the financing statement indicates that the interest 
sions in the underlying security agreement." U.C.C. § 8-410 comment 2 (Sept. 
1949 draft). 
85. U.C.C. § 8-410(1) (Sept. 1949 draft). 
86. Other explanations for this exception are possible. One is that a fun-
gible mass is usually easily apportionable. Recognizing a lien's continuation 
need not, therefore, result in the subordination of other claims. Another pos-
sible explanation is that the description of the collateral in the filing statement 
will also describe the fungible mass. Thus, an interested third party would be 
on notice of the secured party's interest. 
87. U.C.C. § 8-314(1) (Oct. 1949 draft) provided: 
(1) If raw materials, component parts or other goods which con-
tribute to a product are manufactured, processed or commingled so 
that their identity is lost, a security interest in such goods continues 
on the product or resulting mass if the security agreement so provides 
or if the lender has not acquiesced in the loss of identity. The security 
interest in the product continues as a perfected security interest if the 
financing statement indicates that the interest covers the product or 
in case the lender did not acquiesce in the loss of identity even if the 
statement does not so indicate. 
Note that in this draft fungible goods no longer received the special treatment 
of the September 1949 draft. Furthermore, the drafters of this section were 
more concerned with "the problem of priority where raw materials subject to 
a security interest are processed into the finished product," U.C.C. § 8-314 
comment (Oct. 1949 draft), than with problems of commingling. 
88. U.C.C. § 8-314(1) (Oct. 1949 draft). 
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covers the product."89 Section 8-314, however, did not mention 
whether a security interest which continues in a mass remains 
perfected. Another significant change was the deletion of the 
priority statement addressing the rights of the secured party 
with an interest in collateral as against a party claiming a se-
curity interest directly in the mass or product.90 
Except for a change in the section's title,91 no changes of 
any significance were made until the 1956 revision of Article 9. 
It was then that the section was rewritten in its present form. 
III. SECTION 9-315 OF THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 
Section 9-315 is the progeny of three related but concep-
tually distinct pre-Code doctrines-accession,92 specification,93 
and confusion. 94 The scope of this relatively short section is 
surprising and may account for much avoidable complexity and 
ambiguity. Moreover, even a cursory reading of the section 
reveals its dual nature. Unlike most sections in Article 9,95 sec-
tion 9-315 is intended to perform two distinct functions: it spec-
ifies the ways in which a security interest in goods can attach to 
a product or mass of those goods,96 and it provides a priority 
89. Id. 
90. This new priority statement, a forerunner of the current § 9-315(2), 
stated: 
(2) Where under subsection (1) more than one security interest 
attaches to the product, each is on a basis of equality in such product 
in the ratio that the cost of the goods to which the interest originally 
attached bears to the cost of the total product of the manufacture or 
processing in which the original collateral was used or to which it 
contributed. 
U.C.C. § 8-314(2) (Oct. 1949 draft). Similar to the provision in § 8-314(1) re-
garding continuation of perfected security interests, subsection (2) provides a 
priority statement for products but does not mention masses. 
91. Section 8-314 became § 9-315 in 1950, and the word "priority" was ad-
ded to the title in 1951. It then read: "Priority When Goods Axe Commingled 
or Processed." U.C.C. § 9-315 (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1951). 
92. See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text. 
93. See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text. 
94. See supra notes 49-81 and accompanying text. 
95. Most sections in Article 9 address only one aspect of the law of se-
cured transactions. It is, therefore, possible to describe a section as defining 
terms, delineating the scope of the security interest, containing priority rules, 
defining the rights and duties of the parties upon default, etc. Rarely does a 
section deal with more than one of these matters. One notable exception is 
§ 9-306, which both delineates the scope of a secured party's interest, see § 9-
306(2), and contains priority rules, see § 9-306(5). 
96. u.c.c. § 9-315(1). 
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rule for resolving conflicting claims to the product or mass.97 
The drafters were, perhaps, overly ambitious in this undertak-
ing because, as written, the section performs neither of these 
two functions satisfactorily. 
A. ATI'ACHMENT OF THE SECTION 9-315(1) SECURITY INTEREST 
Subsection (1) of section 9-315 describes the ways in which 
a security interest in specific goods can "continue" in the prod-
uct or mass into which those goods have been processed or com-
mingled. This subsection states: 
(1) If a security interest in goods was perfected and subsequently 
the goods or a part thereof have become part of a product or mass, the 
security interest continues in the product or mass if 
(a) the goods are so manufactured, processed, assembled or com-
mingled that their identity is lost in the product or mass; or 
(b) a financing statement covering the original goods also covers 
the product into which the goods have been manufactured, 
processed or assembled. 
In a case to which paragraph (b) applies, no separate security interest 
in that part of the original goods which has been manufactured, 
processed or assembled into the product may be claimed under Sec-
tion 9-314.98 
This automatic shift of a security interest to property not 
covered by the original lien stands in stark contrast to most Ar-
ticle 9 provisions. In most cases, property only becomes subject 
to a security interest if a debtor expressly agrees to that inter-
est in the security agreement.99 When a security interest shifts 
97. u.c.c. § 9-315(2). 
98. u.c.c. § 9-315(1). 
99. A security interest does not usually attach unless "the debtor has 
signed a security agreement which contains a description of the collateral." 
U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a). Furthermore, to be effective against third parties, the 
Code normally requires a secured party to either file a financing statement 
"indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral," U.C.C. § 9-402, or 
to take possession of the collateral. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302 to 9-305. These twin 
requirements of consent and notice to third parties are the foundations upon 
which the structure of Article 9 is built. Yet, these requirements often seem 
to beg the questions of how consent must be manifested and how much notice 
is required. 
The drafters were willing to relax both the consent and notice require-
ments with regard to proceeds. Prior to the 1972 version of the Code, it was 
unclear whether a right to proceeds was dependent upon a specific clause in 
the security agreement. See FINAL REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR 
ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Appendix E-19 at 218 (Apr. 
25, 1971). This ambiguity was resolved in the 1972 Code which expressly gave 
a secured party an interest in proceeds unless otherwise agreed. See §§ 9-
302(2), 9-306(2). Another change wrought by the 1972 Code involved notice to 
third parties of a secured party's claim to proceeds. The 1962 version of§ 9-
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to a product or mass under section 9-315(1)(a), however, the 
shift occurs without the express consent of the debtor. The ra-
tionale behind the decision to make attachment automatic may 
be discernible from the drafting history of the section. Secured 
parties had always been given the means by which to preserve 
their secured status if they feared that the original collateral 
would lose its identity.100 Because it would have been costly 
and inefficient to require secured parties to take an affirmative 
action that they inevitably would have taken, the section's auto-
matic shift can be seen as one of those "off the rack" rules mir-
roring what the parties would or should have agreed to, and it 
is, on that basis, unobjectionable.101 
There are. however, two prerequisites to the section 9-
315(1)(a) automatic shift. The first is that the original collat-
eral must have lost its identity. This is a logical requirement, 
consistent with the pre-Code laws of confusion102 and specifica-
tion,103 and distinguishes the application of subsection (l)(a) 
306(3) provided that the security interest in proceeds would continue perfected 
if the original financing statement covered proceeds. This did little to advance 
the goal of notice, especially if the debtor was involved in multi-state activities. 
The 1972 amendments to § 9-306(3) improved the plight of third parties by re-
quiring that a secured party refile in those situations in which the inability to 
discover a security interest in a particular proceed would be most acute. Be-
cause a refiling is not required in all situations, third parties must often still 
rely on the willingness of the debtor to disclose outstanding interests. 
100. Section 8-314 (Oct. 1949 draft) allowed continuation of the security in-
terest in the product or mass if the parties had so provided in the security 
agreement. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. Even before that 
draft, a secured party could always protect against a loss of lien by taking an 
original interest in all of the debtor's inventory. See U.C.C. § 8-410 comment 1 
(Sept. 1949 draft). 
101. It has been suggested that 
[f]acing positive transaction costs, . . . the legal system provides 
ready-made rules based on common assumptions about typical con-
tracting behavior. These 'off the rack' contract rules reduce the costs 
of exchange by specifying the legal consequences of typical bargains 
where the expected cost of explicit negotiation exceeds the utility de-
rived from individualized exchange. 
Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation 
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient 
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 588 n.87 (1977). 
Although § 9-315(1)(a)'s automatic shift arguably represents what most 
parties would have agreed to, there may be times when the parties would not 
wish to be bound by the provision. Although there is no provision in § 9-315 
similar to that in § 9-203(3) which permits parties to agree that the security 
interest will not attach to proceeds, there appears to be no reason to prohibit 
the parties from opting out of§ 9-315(1)(a) if they wish. 
102. See supra notes 49-81 and accompanying text. 
103. See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text. 
1985] UCC SECTION 9-315 27 
from that of (l)(b).104 Whether there has been a sufficient loss 
of identity would seem to necessitate the same sort of determi-
nation traditionally made when the doctrines of specification 
and confusion were thought to be applicable.105 
The second prerequisite for application of subsection (l)(a) 
is that the original interest must have been perfected.106 While 
one would expect to find priority over third parties conditioned 
on perfection, it is difficult to understand why perfection also 
conditions the attachment of the security interest. The reason 
for such a requirement may be found in the priority rule of sec-
tion 9-315(2),107 which does not distinguish between perfected 
and unperfected secured parties. If two secured parties are to 
be treated equally, as the priority rule requires, it does not 
seem unreasonable to require that their status be equal. Such 
would not be the case if one were perfected and one were not. 
In addition to ·its intuitive appeal, this approach also has the ad-
vantage of preserving the integrity of the Code's other priority 
rules108 and its filing system.109 
104. See infra notes 117-119 and accompanying text. 
105. "There is no elaboration, in text or Comment, of the meaning of the 
phrase 'loss of identity.' " 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 10, § 31.4, at 850. It is 
therefore permissible and desirable to look for its meaning in pre-Code law. 
As Gilmore notes, the Code 
assumes the continuing existence of a large body of pre-Code and non-
Code law on which it rests for support, which it displaces to the least 
possible extent, and without which it could not survive. The solid 
stuff of pre-Code law will furnish the rationale of decision quite as 
often as the Code's own gossamer substance. 
Gilmore, Article 9: What it Does for the Past, 26 LA. L. REv. 285, 286 (1966). 
Pre-code confusion and specification cases can thus be of particular value 
in determining whether or not identity has been lost. In the § 9-315 context, 
the concept is a functional one and should reflect the policies underlying the 
section. Because the purpose of § 9-315 is to protect secured parties who can 
no longer lay claim to a specific and discrete piece or mass of collateral, loss of 
identity should be defined as occurring when it is either impossible or mani-
festly impractical to separate a product or mass into its original components 
and return each specific constituent of these components to its original con-
tributor in its original condition. Such a definition generally comports with 
pre-Code law. See, e.g., R. BROWN, supra note 16, § 6.8, at 62. 
106. This requirement is in marked contrast to the Code's treatment of 
proceeds in § 9-306. Section 9-306(2) gives a secured party an interest in pro-
ceeds regardless of whether the original security interest was perfected. 
Although an unperfected interest is enforceable against the debtor, it is vul-
nerable to the claims of most third parties. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-301. 
107. See infra notes 221-241 and accompanying text. 
108. The Code's priority rules, the bulk of which are located in §§ 9-306 to 
9-315, consistently favor perfected over unperfected secured parties. Also, if 
both perfected and unperfected interests were treated equally under § 9-
315(2), some rather curious disputes would be possible. For example, if a § 9-
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Although there is nothing particularly troublesome about 
subsection (l)(a),11° the same cannot be said for subsection 
(l)(b). At first glance the provision seems clear enough, but 
closer examination reveals several potential trouble spots. Be-
cause the provision addresses accession-type situations, these 
trouble spots need to be analyzed in light of both pre-Code ac-
cession doctrine and section 9-314, a response to that doctrine. 
Prior to the Code, if a good were characterized as an acces-
sion, all pre-affixation security interests in that good would be 
subordinated to outstanding interests in the principal good.111 
The primary rationale for this rule was that it prevented an ec-
onomically inefficient severance of the lesser good from the 
principal good. Because the value of the post-affixation whole 
would exceed the value of the pre-affixation parts following an 
often-damaging severance, this approach maintained the eco-
nomic integrity of the end product.112 Section 9-314 ostensibly 
changes this rule by allowing a secured party with priority in 
an accession to remove the accession from the product.113 Sec-
315(1)(a) product or mass were transferred to a third party, that party may 
take free of the unperfected interest under§ 9-301(1)(c) but may be subject to 
the perfected interest. In such a case, it would be difficult to determine the 
priorities of the parties. 
109. A secured party would often be unable to ascertain the existence of 
prior unperfected secured parties with whom sharing under § 9-315(2) would 
be required. Such a party could rely on the debtor for this information, but 
''because of the possibility of debtor misbehavior, it is undesirable to rely on 
the debtor for information about claims to [the debtor's] own assets." Baird & 
Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 
9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175, 179 (1983). As for subsequent secured parties with 
whom sharing is required, that potential can never be eliminated, but its likeli-
hood can be reduced by the use of restrictive covenants in the security agree-
ment that limit the debtor's right to further encumber his or her property. 
110. One issue that should be mentioned, however, is whether § 9-315(1)(a) 
applies if the collateral's loss of identity is caused by one other than the 
debtor-obligor. If, for example, collateral comes into the possession of a third 
party subject to a security interest and is then commingled with similar prop-
erty of the third party, will the security interest shift to the newly created 
mass? For an affirmative answer, see In re San Juan Packers, Inc., 696 F.2d 
707, 710 (9th Cir. 1983) (commingling by third party); Sterling Nat'l Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Southwire Co., 713 F.2d 684, 688 (11th Cir.) (processing by third 
party), reh'g denied, 718 F.2d 1115 (1983); First Sec. Bank v. Zion First Nat'l 
Bank, 573 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1975) (commingling by third party). 
111. See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text. 
112. This explains why most courts thought the character of the affixation 
depended, in great part, upon the amount of damage a severance would cause 
to either the lesser or principal good. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying 
text. 
113. See U.C.C. § 9-314 comment a. Prior to the Code, courts usually con-
cluded that the attachment was not an accession where the pre-affixation in-
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tion 9-315(1)(b) offers the accession secured party an alterna-
tive114 to section 9-314: it allows the secured party to transfer 
his or her interest in the accession to the final product.115 Such 
an alternative, mirroring the common law concern for eco-
nomic efficiency, cannot be faulted. It preserves the integrity 
of the final product and greatly reduces the potential for over-
reaching by an accessions secured party.116 
Because subdivision (l)(b) is an alternative to section 9-314, 
arguably it should be available only if the original collateral be-
comes a true accession-that is, if it becomes such an integral 
part of the final product that it would be ultimately counter-
productive to remove it. For example, assume that a secured 
party has an interest in a set of tires, and these tires are subse-
quently placed on an automobile. The tires clearly remain 
identifiable, thereby removing the case from the coverage of 
section 9-315(l)(a).117 If they are not accessions,118 however, 
section 9-314 would not always apply, and even if it would, 
terest was a type of security interest. See supra notes 20-36 and accompanying 
text. Section 9-314 thus really only changes the rules of the game, and not, as 
is frequently thought, its outcome. See Nickles, supra note 16, at 146 n.88 (sug-
gesting that§ 9-314 expressly perpetuates the pre-Code rule). 
114. See U.C.C. § 9-315 comment 3 ("[A] secured party is put to an election 
. . . by the last sentence of subsection (1), whether to claim under this section 
or to claim a security interest in one component under Section 9-314."); E. REI-
LEY, GUIDEBOOK TO SECURITY !NTEREsTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 5.4(a) 
(1981). 
115. A third alternative, which may be provided by non-Code law, is for 
the secured party to assert a common law or statutory artisan's lien on the 
whole. These liens are discussed in Lee, Liens on Personal Property not Gov-
erned by the Uniform Commercial Code, 44 N.C.L. REV. 322 (1966). For pur-
poses of this Article, it is assumed that the secured party is unable or 
unwilling to rely on such a lien. 
116. In many instances it would be impractical to remove the accessory af-
ter affixation. It would make little sense if its removal would substantially 
damage it or the principal good. In the latter case, the secured party must 
compensate all claimants to the whole, other than the debtor, for the harm 
caused. See U.C.C. § 9-314(4). What the secured party would want in either 
case is a security interest in the end product. If, however, the identity of the 
specific product is initially unknown (e.g., the exact auto to which the acces-
sory will be affixed) many creditors would, in the absence of§ 9-315(1)(b), de-
mand an original interest in the entire class of potential products (e.g., the 
entire inventory of autos). 
117. Subsection (l)(a) applies only where the original collateral has lost its 
identity. U.C.C. § 9-315(1)(a). 
118. Drawing a line between accessions and non-accessions can often be a 
difficult matter. Compare Bozeman Mortuary Ass'n v. Fairchild, 253 Ky. 74, 
79, 68 S.W.2d 756, 758 (1934) (tires are accessions); Blackwood Tire & Vulcan-
izing Co. v. Auto Storage Co., 133 Tenn. 515, 520, 182 S.W. 576, 577 (1916) (tires 
are accessions) with Mossler Acceptance Co. v. Norton Tire Co., 70 So. 2d 360, 
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there is no need for the section 9-315(1)(b) alternative.119 
The secured party's interest would, therefore, be limited to 
the tires with no right to claim a security interest in the auto-
mobile as a whole under section 9-315(1)(b). Such a result 
makes sense when one realizes that removing the tires causes 
no damage to either the automobile or to the tires themselves. 
Even section 9-314 recognizes, if not the probability, certainly 
the possibility that removal of the accessorial good will damage 
the whole.12° Conversely, µ a good, although attached to an-
other good, is not a true accession, then no presumptive reason 
exists for keeping the two together and an alternative to dis-
memberment of the product is unnecessary. 
In addition to the functional interplay of sections 9-314 and 
361 (Fla. 1954) (tires are not accessions); Passieu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 58 Ga. 
App. 691, 692-93, 199 S.E. 775, 777 (1938) (tires are not accessions). 
As noted supra text accompanying notes 21-26, such results often were 
controlled by the status of the party opposing the claimant to the principal 
good. The better view, however, focuses not on the status of the parties but 
rather on the sufficiency of integration. Id. 
119. As Professor Nickles stated: 
U.C.C. section 9-314 defines accessions as goods that are installed 
in or affixed to other goods. But this definition only establishes the 
scope of section 9-314 which is designed solely to solve certain priority 
disputes. The section exists "[t]o state when a secured party claiming 
an interest in goods installed in or affixed to other goods is entitled to 
priority over a party with a security interest in the whole;" it does not 
state when goods are accessions for the purpose of deciding whether 
an interest in the principal collateral reaches them, too, by operation 
of law. This determination depends on whether the goods are acces-
sions under common law principles according to which, it is clear, 
goods are not accessions and part of the whole simply because they 
are installed in or affixed to the principal collateral. Therefore, sec-
tion 9-314's scope as a priority provision includes conflicts over goods 
that are accessions under common law doctrine and, also, conflicts 
over goods that are not even though they are installed in or affixed to 
collateral, i.e., goods that are categorized as "accessories" for this arti-
cle's purposes. But section 9-314 is totally irrelevant to the issue 
whether accessions or accessories, however defined, are subject by op-
eration of law or otherwise to anyone's security interest. 
Nickles, supra note 16, at 118 (footnotes omitted) (quoting U.C.C. § 9-314 com-
ment 1). Section 9-314's right of removal, therefore, is only necessary when 
the accessorial good has become subject to the security interest in the principal 
good. 
The party with a security interest in the principal good may acquire an in-
terest in the accessorial good other than through the doctrine of accession if 
the original security agreement so provides. If this were the case, § 9-314's re-
moval right would apply even if the good were not a true accession. See id. at 
136-43. In these situations, § 9-315(1)(b) arguably should not apply. Because 
the affixed good is not an integral part of the principal good, there is no need 
to supply an alternative to § 9-314's removal right. 
120. See U.C.C. § 9-314(4). 
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9-315, there is a further justification for limiting section 9-
315(1) (b) to situations involving true accessions. When a se-
cured party elects to be treated under section 9-315(1)(b), the 
financing statement will not accurately describe or indicate the 
ultimate collateral. It will only reflect the original collateral 
and the section 9-315(1)(b) election.121 In such a case, a subse-
quent party is less likely to know that a product to which the 
original collateral is affixed is subject to a security interest. 
This, in turn, could adversely affect the efficacy of the Code's 
system of notice filing. Seen in this context, it is preferable 
that the right to elect a security interest in the whole should be 
limited to those cases when it would produce a net benefit, a 
result achieved only when the lesser good is a true accession. 
Section 9-315(l)(b) raises several other points worth ex-
ploring. First, an effective election requires that the original 
security interest be perfected. This requirement is imposed by 
both the introductory language of the section and the specifica-
tion that the election must be made in a financing statement. 
This exception to the Article 9 norm can perhaps be explained 
by the failure of section 9-315(2) to distinguish between per-
fected and unperfected security interests.122 Requiring perfec-
tion as a condition for automatic attachment under section 9-
315(1) (a) is of little consequence; the same is not true, however, 
when a section 9-315(1)(b) election is implicated. Because this 
election is precluded if the interest is not perfected, a secured 
party would then be forced to rely on section 9-314 and sever its 
original collateral from the product regardless of the costs in-
volved.123 This problem could, of course, be easily remedied by 
removing the perfection requirement from section 9-315(1) and, 
instead, incorporating the concept into the priority rule of sec-
tion 9-315(2). 
When a secured party decides to elect treatment under sec-
tion 9-315(1)(b), a practical problem arises. The provision states 
that the financing statement must cover "the product into 
which the goods have been manufactured, processed or assem-
121. See infra notes 124-128 and accompanying text. 
122. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text. 
123. If, after severance, the combined value of the lesser and principal good 
would be less than the value of the whole before severance, it would effect a 
reduction in the debtor's net worth. Such a result is not only detrimental to 
the debtor, but would also work to the collective disadvantage of its other 
creditors. Cf. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the 
Creditor's Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860-71 (1982) (discussing the aggregate 
advantages to creditors of collective bankruptcy proceedings). 
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bled."124 It is unclear whether this language requires a specific 
description of the product, a simple checking of a "products 
box,"125 or a repetition of the non-descriptive language of the 
statute.126 Although the failure to actually describe the product 
impairs the effectiveness of the filing, 127 in many cases it is an 
unavoidable result. Often a secured party will not know the 
identity of the end product. In such a case, requiring more than 
a general indication that the security interest extends to prod-
ucts of the described collateral would rob section 9-315(l)(b) of 
its utility.128 Moreover, if a secured party knew the identity of 
124. U.C.C. § 9-315(1)(b). Because the financing statement must be signed 
by the debtor, U.C.C. § 9-402(1), the election requires the debtor's consent. 
This contrasts with the "consent is assumed" approach of § 9-315(1)(a). See 
supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. Although the financing statement 
must cover products, it is unclear whether provision for products must also be 
made in the security agreement. Even if such provision is required, nothing 
should hinge on its absence. When determining if the requirements of § 9-203 
have been met, courts should be willing to read the financing statement in 
conjunction with any document entitled "security agreement." See, e.g., Na-
tional Ropes, Inc. v. National Diving Serv., Inc., 513 F.2d 53, 57-60 (5th Cir. 
1975) (determining scope of security interest by interpreting "General Pledge 
Agreement"); In re Numeric Corp., 485 F.2d 1328, 1332 (1st Cir. 1973) ("an ade-
quate agreement can be found when a financing statement is considered to-
gether with other documents"); Little v. County of Orange, 31 N.C. App. 495, 
498, 229 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1976) ("two or more writings can be incorporated to 
satisfy the requirements"). 
125. Most, if not all, standard financing statements provide a box to be 
checked if a claim to products is intended. See B. CLARK, supra note 16, § 2.9, 
at 2-31 to 2-32. The form financing statement set forth in § 9-402(3) requires 
nothing more. 
126. Although courts that have considered this issue have done so in a su-
perficial manner, the opinions do hint at a need for specificity. The financing 
statement in First Nat'l Bank v. Bostron, 39 Colo. App. 107, 564 P.2d 964 
(1977), apparently contained the catchword "products." Id. at 108, 564 P.2d at 
965. Yet, the court there found that "since the financing statement did not 
specifically cover the product ... the language of§ 4-9-315(1)(b) ... does not 
support [the secured party's] claim." Id. at 109, 564 P.2d at 966 (emphasis ad-
ded). See also Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Southwire Co., 713 F.2d 684 
(11th Cir.), reh 'g denied, 718 F.2d 1115 (1983), where although § 9-315(1)(a) 
was apparently the relevant provision, the court justified its decision that the 
secured party's lien attached to the product on the ground that "the financing 
statement did so cover the goods in process and the .finished product, the cop-
per cathode." Id. at 688 (emphasis added). 
127. This statement assumes that a legal rule that requires, wherever pos-
sible, a specific description of collateral is preferable to one which would per-
mit overbroad descriptions. Compare Baird & Jackson, supra note 109 
(endorsing a specific description of collateral), with Shanker, A Proposal for a 
Simplified All-Embracing Security Interest, 14 U.C.C. L.J. 23 (1981) (arguing 
that the formalistic ceremony of specific descriptions should be scrapped). 
128. Because a secured party often is unable to predict the eventual dispo-
sition of proceeds when a financing statement is first filed, these same issues 
1985] UCC SECTION 9-315 33 
the end product in advance, there would be no real need for the 
subsection because a security interest could then be taken di-
rectly in that product. 
One word of caution, however, is in order. Although many 
courts have been loathe to impose filing obligations on secured 
parties other than those expressly required by Article 9, such 
an occurrence remains a possibility.129 If, for example, a se-
cured party knew the identity of the product at the time of fil-
ing, a court might find that the omission of its description 
amounted to an act of bad faith. Such a finding would, presum-
ably, negate the attempted election and result in the secured 
party's interest being limited to the original collateral.130 
Another issue under section 9-315(1)(b) concerns the revo-
cability of the election. The official comment suggests that 
once made, such an election is irrevocable.131 Why this should 
be the rule remains a mystery, since irrevocability would not 
appear to advance any Code policies and would serve only to 
have been addressed in the § 9-306 context. Prior to the 1972 amendments, 
§ 9-306(3) provided that a security interest was continuously perfected in pro-
ceeds if the financing statement "covers proceeds." When construing this lan-
guage, courts required no more than an abstract reference to proceeds. See, 
e.g., Matthews v. Arctic Tire, Inc., 106 R.I. 691, 695, 262 A.2d 831, 834 (1970). 
129. For example, prior to the addition of § 9-402(7) in 1972, one recurrent 
issue was whether a refiling was necessary following a debtor's name change. 
The majority of courts refused to require a new filing. See, e.g., In re Kit-
tyhawk Television Corp., 516 F.2d 24, 28 (6th Cir. 1975); Continental Oil Co. v. 
Citizens Trust & Sav. Bank, 397 Mich. 203, 208-09, 244 N.W.2d 243, 245 (1976); 
In re Pasco Sales Co., 77 Misc. 2d 724, 726, 354 N.Y.S.2d 402, 404 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1974). Some courts, however, did require such filing, in certain circumstances, 
as when the secured party had knowledge at the time of the filing that a name 
change was imminent. See In re Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc., 503 F.2d 1218, 
1222-23 (6th Cir. 1974); see also In re A-1 Imperial Moving & Storage Co., 350 
F. Supp. 1188, 1189 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (debtor's name change required new filing 
despite secured party's lack of knowledge of the change). It is, therefore, con-
ceivable that a court might rely on the latter cases or perhaps analogize § 9-
315(1)"(b) to the 1972 amendments to§ 9-306(3) and impose a refiling obligation 
under§ 9-315(1)(b) once the product's identity becomes known. 
130. See also lA P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. V AGTS, & J. MCDONNELL, SE-
CURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (MB) 
§ 7.11A[2][y] [hereinafter cited as SECURED TRANSACTIONS] (suggesting that 
under§ 9-315(1)(b), "reliance on the English language for an adequate descrip-
tion is plainly advisable"); cf. In re Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc., 503 F.2d 
1218, 1222-23 (6th Cir. 1974) (failure to file under a name later adopted by the 
debtor results in a loss of perfection when the secured party was aware that 
the name change was imminent at the time of the original filing). 
131. Comment 3 to § 9-315 states, in part, that "a secured party is put to an 
election at the time of filing, by the last sentence of subsection (1), whether to 
claim under this section or to claim a security interest in one component under 
Section 9-314." (emphasis added). 
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make a secured party's interest less valuable.132 Certainly the 
language of the section itself does. not mandate this result.133 
The last sentence of section 9-315(1) should be read as provid-
ing for an irrevocable election at the time the security interest 
is enforced, not when it is perfected. That a section 9-315(1)(b) 
election should become irrevocable at some point becomes clear 
when one realizes that the purpose of the election is to provide 
an alternative to the dismemberment of the product that would 
otherwise result under section 9-314. A change in election from 
section 9-314 to section 9-315(1)(b), or vice-versa, after enforce-
ment of the security interest would require the accession either 
to be removed or reinstalled-clearly an unacceptable result 
under an efficiency analysis as well as one potentially unfair to 
parties other than the claimant. There are no such reasons, 
however, to preclude such a change of election at any time 
prior to enforcement. 
B. THE EXTENT OF THE SECTION 9-315(1) SECURITY INTEREST 
Under section 9-315(1), a perfected security interest in 
goods that have become part of a product or mass continues in 
that product or mass. Although it is clear that this continued 
interest initially embraces the entire product or mass, the sec-
tion does not state whether upon enforcement of this interest 
the secured party is entitled to satisfaction of the entire secured 
debt, assuming the disposition proceeds are sufficient, or 
merely to recover the value of the original collateral. If the se-
cured party was initially undercollateralized, a common occur-
rence, this issue becomes extremely important.134 
An analysis of section 9-315(1) might lead one to conclude 
that the drafters intended nothing more than to permit a se-
132. Because application of§ 9-315(1)(b) does not necessarily give a secured 
party a proportionate share under § 9-315(2), see infra notes 222-241 and ac-
companying text, it is quite possible that the secured party would be better off 
proceeding under § 9-314. Requiring such an uninformed decision at the time 
of filing reduces the secured party's perception of the value of his or her 
position. 
133. This is true even though Professor Gilmore suggests that the 
"[c]omment may be taken as an authoritative statement of what the text was 
meant to mean." 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 10, § 31.4, at 849. 
134. In the case of a § 9-315(1) product, a security interest limited only by 
the value of the secured debt would grant to an undersecured creditor the 
value added by the debtor's labor, other materials used, and any synergistic in-
crease attributable to the resulting combination. In the case of a § 9-315(1)(a) 
commingled mass, the additional value will result from the value of the addi-
tional items commingled with the collateral. 
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cured party to trace his or her collateral into the final product 
or mass. Tracing is a restitutionary remedy originally devel-
oped by courts of equity to allow a beneficiary of a trust to fol-
low and claim, as part of the trust res, the product of trust 
assets misappropriated by the trustee.135 The result was to give 
the beneficiary an in specie claim to property not otherwise 
subject to the provisions of the trust. The doctrine eventually 
sprouted several branches, including "exchange tracing" and 
"commingled fund tracing."136 Exchange tracing was permitted 
when property was wrongfully transferred and the transferor 
received, in exchange, other property.137 Commingled fund 
tracing allowed a claimant to follow money improperly placed 
into a fund that also included money belonging to the 
wrongdoer.138 
Many of the principles of exchange and commingled fund 
tracing appear in the Code's treatment of proceeds in section 9-
306(2). Indeed, that section appears to adopt exchange tracing 
almost wholesale,139 with the only deviation being that a se-
cured party's claim to proceeds is in no way dependent on any 
wrongdoing by the debtor.140 The applicability of commingled 
fund tracing under section 9-306(2) is not quite as apparent. Its 
incorporation into the section is the product of the Code's re-
quirement that proceeds, in order to be subject to a security in-
135. For a general discussion of this doctrine, see RESTATEMENT OF RESTI-
TUTION §§ 202-215 (1936); 5 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 507-522 {3d ed. 
1967). See also Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace Mis-
appropriated Property in Equity and in UCC § 9-306, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 172 
(1983), in which the doctrine is justly criticized for many of its basic 
assumptions. 
136. See Oesterle, supra note 135, at 174. 
137. Professor Scott emphasizes the present scope of this branch of the 
doctrine, stating: 
The principal is a broad one. It is applicable not only where the 
wrongdoer is an express trustee, not only where he is a fiduciary, but 
wherever a person wrongfully transfers property in which another 
has the beneficial interest, whether legal or equitable, and receives 
other property in exchange therefor. 
5 A. SCOTT, supra note 135, § 507, at 3571. 
138. Historically, English courts were of the opinion that because "money 
has no earmark" its tracing should not be permitted. It was not until 1879, 
when Jessel, M.R., wrote the opinion in In re Hallett's Estate, 13 Ch. D. 696 
(1880), that this branch of tracing firmly took root. 
139. See Oesterle, supra note 135, at 211 ("The section generally adopts ex-
change tracing-hook, line, and sinker."). 
140. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2). Some courts have, however, misread the section, 
reaching the erroneous conclusion that a secured party has no interest in pro-
ceeds if it authorized the disposition of its collateral. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank 
v. Bostron, 39 Colo. App. 107, 110, 564 P.2d 964, 966 (1977). 
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terest, must be identifiable.141 It is now relatively settled that 
the drafters intended tracing principles to be employed to make 
identifiable, albeit artificially, cash proceeds that have been 
mingled with cash from other sources.142 
As noted earlier,143 section 9-315 is similar to section 9-306 
in that both sections provide for the extension of a secured 
party's lien to property not originally subject to that lien. In-
deed, the major difference between the two sections in this re-
gard is definitional, not functional.144 As one of the drafters of 
141. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2). 
142. See supra note 6 and sources cited therein. The doctrine of tracing is 
superseded, however, where a debtor is the subject of an insolvency proceed-
ing. In its place is substituted a perplexing formula, see§ 9-306(4)(d), that has 
proved troublesome both for courts, see, e.g., In re Gibson Products, 543 F.2d 
652, 655-57 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1976); Fitzpatrick v. Philco 
Fin. Corp., 491F.2d1288, 1291-92 (7th Cir. 1974), and for commentators, see 2 
G. GILMORE, supra note 10, § 45.9; Epstein, "Proceeding" Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 30 Omo ST. L.J. 787, 792-808 (1969); Skilton, supra note 6 at 
129; Note, Bankrupting the Proceeds Section: Recent Interpretations of Sec-
tion 9-306(4)(d) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 55 TExAs L. REV. 891, 897-
910 (1977). 
143. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
144. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 10, § 31.4, at 847, where it is explained 
that: 
the § 9-306 term "proceeds" is restricted to what is received by a 
debtor "when collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or 
otherwise disposed of." In the § 9-315 situation, the product or mass 
remains in the hands of the debtor who had the goods: since there 
has been no disposition, the "proceeds" provisions of § 9-306 are not 
applicable; the product or mass is not, technically, "proceeds" of the 
goods .... 
Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 9-306). 
Section 9-315 or 9-306 will, in most cases, provide substitute collateral 
where resort to the original collateral is no longer feasible. There are situa-
tions, however, where neither section will apply. Consider, for example, the 
situation in First Nat'l Bank v. Bostron, 39 Colo. App. 107, 564 P.2d 964 (1977), 
in which a creditor with a security interest in feed asserted a security interest 
in the cattle that ate the feed under §§ 9-306 and 9-315. The court rejected 
both claims, concluding "that cattle are neither a 'product' nor a 'mass' as 
these terms are used in the statute," id. at 109, 564 P.2d at 966, nor are they 
"traceable proceeds to which the security interest may be said to have at-
tached," id. at 110, 564 P.2d at 966. Anticipating such a case, one commentator 
expressed concern that if § 9-315 is applied, the pro rata sharing rule of § 9-
315(2) might greatly deflate the value of the original security interest in the 
cattle because "[t]he cost of the unfattened dairy calf may not be as great as 
the aggregate cost of its feed over a long period of time." Clark, Some 
Problems in Agricultural Lending Under the UCC, 39 CoLO. L. REV. 352, 363 
(1967). This concern, however, erroneously assumes that application of § 9-
315(1) requires application of § 9-315(2). Section 9-315(1) could have been 
used, even if only by analogy, to extend the lien on the feed to the cattle with-
out necessarily implicating § 9-315(2). See infra notes 199-214 and accompany-
ing text. 
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section 9-315 noted, "[a]s a matter of English usage, there would 
be no difficulty in saying that a product represents the 'pro-
ceeds' of the materials that have gone into it."145 Because of 
this functional similarity, one would expect to find a similarity 
in the operative provisions of each section. The admirable goal 
of treating similar situations similarly would also suggest that 
ambiguities in the sections be resolved, if possible, in a like 
manner.146 It therefore may be helpful to keep the tracing 
principles of section 9-306 in mind when asking whether these 
principles can be used to define the extent of the section 9-
315(1) security interest. 
Like section 9-306,147 section 9-315(1) clothes a secured 
party with what appears to be the equivalent of the equitable 
right to trace by allowing a secured party to lay claim to goods 
that differ from the original collateral. Although technically 
there is no exchange of property, a secured party is in fact able 
to "exchange" an interest in specific goods for an interest in the 
product into which those goods are manufactured, assembled, 
or processed.148 Principles of commingled fund tracing appear 
in the section 9-315(1) approach to commingled masses, albeit 
regarding goods instead of money.149 The apparent presence of 
tracing principles in section 9-315(1) as well as in section 9-
306(2) suggests that these principles may be of value when as-
certaining the extent of the section 9-315(1) security interest.150 
145. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 10, § 31.4, at 846. 
146. The policy decisions made in § 9-306 should, unless a justification for 
the contrary appears, receive recognition when applying the provisions of § 9-
315. See U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 1 (''The text of each section should be read in 
the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also 
of the Act as a whole .... "). 
147. See supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text. 
148. That this type of "exchange" occurs is supported by the fact that for a 
secured party to be treated under§ 9-315(1)(b), he or she must relinquish any 
claims under § 9-314. See infra notes 113-115 and accompanying text. Thus, in 
a case in which the collateral maintains its original identity, the secured party 
"exchanges" an interest in the original collateral for an interest in the final 
product. 
149. See U.C.C. § 9-315(1)(a). 
150. The Code itself recognizes the continued vitality of extra-Code princi-
ples, see supra note 105, especially equitable principles. See U.C.C. § 1-103; 
Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 906, 908 (1978). Common sense dictates, 
however, that "[c]aution should be used in borrowing rules from other fields 
and applying them to secured transactions.'' Skilton, supra note 6, at 156. 
Beyond the scope of this Article is the extent to which the Bankruptcy 
Code taketh away what § 9-315(1) giveth. A secured party must be concerned 
about the possible occurrence of a preference, see 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982), and 
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Under the exchange tracing branch of the doctrine, the ex-
tent of the claimant's interest depends on the nature of the 
wrongdoing. If the substitute asset is held by a "conscious 
wrongdoer" who obtained the original property by "fraud, du-
ress, ... undue influence, or ... intention[al] convers[ion]," 
the claimant is entitled to the imposition of a constructive 
trust.151 Because the substitute property is received in specie, 
the claimant receives its full value, which may very well exceed 
the value of what was lost. On the other hand, if the substitute 
property is possessed by an "innocent converter,"152 successful 
tracing will entitle the claimant only to an equitable lien on the 
substitute property in the amount of the misappropriated prop-
erty's value.153 This precludes the realization of any profit if 
the newly acquired property is worth more than the original. 
Applying these exchange tracing principles to a section 9-
315 product, however, would lead to anomalous results. As pre-
viously discussed, one of the most noteworthy features of the 
early drafts of what is now section 9-315(1) was that the contin-
uation of the security interest in the product often depended on 
whether the debtor's actions had been authorized.154 In other 
words, these drafts were fault-based. Because the present sec-
tion 9-315 does not address culpability, it would be anomalous 
to once again interject this concept into the section when deter-
mining the extent of the interest. It would also be inconsistent 
that tracing assets into a commingled mass will not be allowed. See, e.g., In re 
Independence Land Title Corp., 18 Bankr. 673 (Bankr. N.D. ill. 1982). 
151. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 202 comment c (1936). The con-
structive trust was developed in equity "for much the same reason that 
brought forth the quasi-contract at law: it was needed to prevent unjust en-
richment and force a restitution to the plaintiff of something that in equity 
and good conscience did not belong to the defendant." D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES, § 4.3, at 241 (1973). 
152. This phrase is borrowed from RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 203 
(1936). An innocent converter includes one who disposes of the claimant's 
property without knowledge that the disposition is unauthorized as well as a 
gratuitous transferee. Id. §§ 203-204. 
153. Id. at § 203. The difference between an equitable lien and a construc-
tive trust can be summarized as follows: 
[T]he constructive trust gives a complete title to the plaintiff, the eq-
uitable lien only gives him a security interest in the property, which 
he can then use to satisfy a money claim. Thus an equitable lien may 
be "foreclosed,'' by selling the property that has been subjected to the 
lien and by applying the proceeds to payment of the plaintifrs claim. 
This results in only a money payment to the plaintiff and obviously 
does not carry with it the advantages of recovering specific property. 
D. DOBBS, supra note 151, § 4.3, at 249. 
154. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text. 
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with the principles underlying sections 9-306(2)155 and 9-205156 
to give fault a role to play, however minor. Furthermore, there 
would be a practical significance to elevating the concept to rel-
evance. Every case in which a secured party's claim to a prod-
uct depended on section 9-315(1) would then involve an 
additional issue. Because a myriad of factors conceivably could 
bear on a determination of fault,157 secured parties would often 
be unsure of their status, leading to inefficiency and possible ju-
dicial intervention.158 Therefore, to whatever extent exchange 
tracing principles appear in section 9-315's treatment of prod-
ucts, traditional notions of fault should not be employed to de-
fine the extent of the security interest. 
Rejecting fault-based notions regarding section 9-315(1) 
products still leaves unanswered the question of the extent of 
the security interest in those products. For a number of rea-
sons, this interest should be limited by the value of the secured 
debt, rather than the value of the original collateral. One prob-
lem is that a limited interest159 might have the deleterious ef-
fect of decreasing the product's value at a forced sale, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of a deficiency or the amount of an 
unavoidable deficiency. For example, assume that the amount 
of the secured debt is $75, but the value of the original collat-
eral is less than $75. Further assume that the collateral is man-
ufactured, assembled, or processed into a product such that the 
155. Fault is relevant under § 9-306(2) for the purpose of determining 
whether the security interest continues in the original collateral, but not for 
determining whether it attaches to identifiable proceeds. One justification for 
the disparate approach is that in the former instance the rights of third parties 
are directly affected, whereas, in the latter, they are not. 
156. See supra note 83. 
157. The complexity of determining which actions of a debtor are or are 
not authorized is best evidenced by those cases involving the struggle to decide 
whether a debtor's disposition of collateral was "otherwise" authorized under 
§ 9-306(2). See, e.g., United States v. Central Livestock Ass'n, 349 F. Supp. 
1033, 1034 (D.N.D. 1972); In re Cadwell Martin Meat Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 710, 716 (E.D. Cal. 1970); Planters Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Bowles, 
256 Ark. 1063, 1071, 511 S.W.2d 645, 649 (1974); Central Cal. Equip. Co. v. Dolk 
Tractor Co., 78 Cal. App. 3d 855, 860, 144 Cal. Rptr., 367, 371 (1978); Milnes v. 
General Elec. Credit Corp., 377 So. 2d 725, 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Lis-
bon Bank & Trust Co. v. Murray, 206 N.W.2d 96, 98 (Iowa 1973); Clovis Nat'! 
Bank v. Thomas, 77 N.M. 554, 559, 425 P.2d 726, 731 (1967); Central Washing-
ton Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Baker, 11 Wash. App.17, 19, 521P.2d226, 227 (1974). 
158. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
159. The term "limited interest" will be used to signify a security interest 
in a product or mass that is limited to the value of the original collateral. "Un-
limited interest" refers to a security interest in a product or mass that is lim-
ited only by the value of the underlying secured debt. 
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secured party's interest attaches to the product under section 9-
315(1). If the secured party's interest in the product were lim-
ited to the value of the original collateral, he or she would have 
no incentive to dispose of the collateral after default for more 
than that amount.160 Attempts to obtain any more would ini-
tially inure to the benefit of the debtor and other creditors. On 
the other hand, if the claim were limited only by the amount of 
the debt, the secured party would have every reason to actively 
seek a price of $75 which would, if obtainable, avoid any 
deficiency.161 
Another problem which would inexorably flow from a de-
cision to limit the secured party's claim is how that claim is to 
be valued. Irrespective of the method used, it must be based on 
the value of the original collateral. There are problems with 
such a valuation process. For example, the relevant value could 
be either wholesale, retail, or forced disposition. Further, this 
value could be determined at different times: at the time the 
security interest first attached, at the time of the collateral's in-
tegration into the product, or at the time of the product's dispo-
sition.162 Even if these and similar issues could be satisfactorily 
resolved, it is unlikely that parties with competing interests 
would ever assign the same value to the same good. Whatever 
the valuation method, costly and wasteful litigation would be 
inevitable. 
Another factor that militates against a limited security in-
terest in a product is the desirability of maintaining a parallel 
with the exchange tracing principles of the Code's treatment of 
proceeds. There is nothing in the language of section 9-306(2) 
that would suggest an intention to equate the interest in the 
proceeds with the value of the original collateral.163 It would 
160. The disincentive to maximize the disposition price is further rein-
forced by "[t]he fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a 
different time or in a different method from that selected by the secured party 
is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a commer-
cially reasonable manner." U.C.C. § 9-507(2). 
161. This example assumes that upon default the creditor has the right to 
control disposition of the collateral. See Nickles, Rights and Remedies Be-
tween UCC Article 9 Secured Parties with Conflicting Security Interests in 
Goods, 68 IOWA L. REV. 217, 219 (1983). 
162. For a valuable discussion of many of the issues inherent in any valua-
tion process, see Cohen, ''Value" Juclgments: Accounts Receivable Financing 
and Voidable Preferences Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 66 MINN. L. REV. 
639 (1982). 
163. In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co., 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1217 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979) appears to be the only case in which a court 
felt that an interest in proceeds should be limited. Involved was a secured 
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be odd to permit a secured party to improve his or her position 
as the result of a disposition of collateral but to prohibit that 
improvement where collateral has been integrated into a prod-
uct or in some other way altered. 
The final justification for an unlimited security interest in 
a product pertains only when section 9-315(1)(b) applies. If the 
primary purpose of that subsection is to provide an alternative 
to the product's dismemberment,164 limiting the security inter-
est would defeat that purpose. The reason a secured party 
would elect an interest in the product in the first place is that 
the value of the secured party's share of this product would ex-
ceed the value of the accession if severed. It would be counter-
productive to adopt a rule that has the effect of taking from a 
secured party that excess value. 
The suggestion that a security interest that attaches to a 
section 9-315(1) product should be unlimited still leaves open 
the question of the extent of a secured party's interest in a sec-
tion 9-315(1)(a) mass because of the fundamental difference be-
tween a product and a mass. A mass is easily divisible without 
risk of harm to its component parts, whereas a product is not. 
Given this and other practical differences, it is quite possible 
that a different conclusion is called for. 
The common law has always treated the problem of prop-
erty interests in a commingled mass differently from title dis-
putes involving a single article. Whenever evidence was 
available regarding the extent of the respective interests in a 
commingled mass, those interests were respected.165 Even 
those who would abrogate the doctrine of confusion and di-
rectly apply the commingled fund branch of tracing suggest 
limiting the interest of the claimant to the value of the original 
collateral.166 Moreover, the drafting history of section 9-
315(1)(a) discloses an intent by the drafters to provide a se-
cured party with a limited interest.167 Although it would be an-
alytically sound to premise a conclusion that the security 
party's claim to shares of stock received by the debtor partnership in exchange 
for its inventory and accounts, which were subject to the original security in-
terest. Without explanation, the court stated that "to whatever extent [the 
shares] represent that portion of the partnership's assets which are attributa-
ble to the inventory and accounts, [the secured party] has a valid claim to the 
shares." Id. at 1222. 
164. See supra notes 112-120 and accompanying text. 
165. See supra notes 49-81 and accompanying text. 
166. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 214 (1936); 5 A. SCOTT, supra 
note 135, § 520, at 3642-44. 
167. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
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interest does not attach to the entire value of the mass solely 
on common law and statutory antecedents of section 9-
315(1) (a), there are more compelling reasons for reaching that 
result. 
It bears repeating that the Code is not an ad hoc collection 
of commercial statutes, each operating within its own sphere of 
influence, but is rather a system of interlocking parts woven to-
gether by strands of common policy concerns. It is, therefore, 
highly desirable that a construction of section 9-315(l)(a) 
should be congruent with perceived policy determinations evi-
denced by other Code sections.168 Much insight can be gained 
from a brief reconsideration of section 9-306(2) and the problem 
of commingled cash proceeds. 
The continuation of a secured party's interest in proceeds 
depends on their being identifiable. When commingled in a 
bank account, it is clear that proceeds are no longer identifiable 
if the term is given its literal meaning. The overwhelming ma-
jority of courts, however, have defined that term expansively to 
permit identification by resort to traditional tracing rules.169 
These rules limit the security interest in the account to the 
amount of proceeds deposited.170 
Equally supportive of a limited interest in a section 9-
315(1) (a) mass is section 9-207(2)(d), which provides that 
"[u]nless otherwise agreed, when collateral is in the secured 
party's possession ... the secured party must keep the collat-
168. Referring to the Code, Chancellor Hawkland observed that 
[i]t is systematic in that all of its parts, arranged in an orderly fashion 
and stated with a consistent terminology, form an interlocking, inte-
grated body, revealing its own plan and containing its own methodol-
ogy. It is comprehensive in that it is sufficiently inclusive and 
independent to enable it to be administered in accordance with its 
own basic policies. 
Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291, 
292. 
169. See supra note 6. Although several methods of tracing are possible, 
see D. DOBBS, supra note 151, § 5.16, at 421-30, the prevailing view is to use the 
lowest intermediate balance rule or, as it is sometimes called, the Rule of Jes-
sel's Bag, derived from the opinion of Jessel, M.R. in In re Hatchett's Estate, 
13 Ch. D. 696 (1879). Briefly stated, the rule presumes that withdrawals from 
the fund are of monies not subject to the security interest. If the balance of 
the fund slips below the amount of commingled proceeds, the secured party's 
claim is limited to the lowest intermediate balance between the time of com-
mingling and the time the fund is to be distributed. For an excellent illustra-
tion of how this rule operates, see Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers 
Bank of Portageville, 358 F. Supp. 317, 325 (E.D. Mo. 1973). 
170. See, e.g., C.0. Funk & Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan Equip., Inc., 89 Ill. 2d 27, 
32-33, 431 N.E.2d 370, 373 (1982); Henning, supra note 6, at 229. 
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eral identifiable but fungible collateral may be commingled." 
That provision hardly contemplates that the sole act of com-
mingling by the secured party should work to the debtor's ad-
vantage by allowing the debtor to receive back more goods than 
he or she parted with or upon his or her default to be credited 
with the value of the entire mass or its proceeds. 
Apart from textual and historical support for a limited in-
terest, 171 there is an independent policy reason calling for this 
approach. If the entire value of the mass stood as potential col-
lateral, a "situational monopoly" would occur.172 Because the 
security interest would not be temporally defined,173 it would 
potentially extend not only to the mass as it existed at the time 
of the original commingling, but also to the mass as it changes 
over time. Put another way, a secured party's interest would 
attach to after-acquired property that becomes part of the mass. 
The secured creditor with an interest in the after-acquired 
property would then enjoy an advantage in dealing with the 
debtor not enjoyed by most other creditors.174 Although per-
171. There is also some judicial support for this position, but it lacks per-
suasiveness. In In re Agricultural Business Co., Bankr. No. 9628-B-1, (D. Kan. 
Oct. 29, 1976) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (order granting 
motion to alter or amend), a case involving the commingling of fertilizer sub-
ject to a security interest, the court summarily stated that the secured party 
"can claim a perfected security interest in the equivalent dollar value of ferti-
lizer as it arrived at the facility. . . . To this extent, it can claim a perfected 
security interest in the entire mass of commingled fertilizer." Id. Detracting 
from the significance of this statement is the following language in the parties' 
security agreement: "In the event the Debtor blends the above products into 
other fertilizer solutions the equivalent dollar value of the goods supplied . . . 
shall be deemed collateral." Id. (emphasis added). It is, therefore, unclear 
whether the court is construing § 9-315(1) or simply carrying out the intent of 
the parties. 
172. For an extensive treatment of the situational monopoly resulting from 
a secured creditor's claim to a debtor's after-acquired property, see Jackson & 
Kronman, supra note 7, at 1167-75. Other examples of situational monopolies 
can be found in Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 13, 23-25 (1972); Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 
367 (1978). 
173. If it were, the extent of the security interest would be determined as 
of a specific date. If, following that date, the value of the mass were to in-
crease, the interest would be limited to its predetermined value. This, of 
course, contradicts the present assumption. 
174. Because of the first-in-time priority rule of § 9-312(5), other creditors 
who later take a security interest in the mass or items that become part of that 
mass will be forced into a subordinate position. This competitive advantage 
awarded to the after-acquired creditor is lessened somewhat by the super-pri-
ority afforded purchase money security interests, see U.C.C. § 9-312(3)-(4); 
Jackson & Kronman, supra note 7, at 1167-75, and by § 9-315(2)'s pro rata 
sharing rule, see infra notes 222-239 and accompanying text. 
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mitting a security interest to attach to after-acquired property 
has its benefits,175 there are inherent societal costs.176 If a se-
cured party's interest were unlimited, those costs would often 
be excessive because the monopoly position is presumably un-
bargained for and would not be reflected in the rate of return 
demanded. Moreover, the transaction giving rise to this after-
acquired interest frequently would not involve the type of fi-
nancing pattern to which such an interest is best-suited.177 
The conclusion that a secured party's interest in the mass 
should be limited to the value of the commingled collateral 
raises the issue of who should bear the burden of proving this 
value. In most cases, it should be shouldered by the party op-
posing the section 9-315(1)(a) claimant.178 Once a secured party 
can show commingling, he or she initially should be able to lay 
claim to the entire mass. The opposing party could then limit 
this claim by proving the value of the original collateral. Once 
this value has been determined, the original claimant would re-
ceive a portion of the mass or proceeds equal in value to that of 
the original collateral. Such a system generally comports with 
pre-Code confusion cases.179 
The notion of a limited interest in a section 9-315(1)(a) 
mass is fully consistent with the argument favoring an unlim-
ited interest in a product. A mass is apportionable, and there is 
no reason why a secured party upon default should not receive 
collateral or proceeds equal in value to the original collateral. 
Because a product normally cannot be so divided, a secured 
party must look to a share of the proceeds upon disposition. In 
175. By including an after-acquired property clause in the security agree-
ment, the parties can accomplish in one transaction what would otherwise 
take numerous transactions to accomplish. Therefore, "[b]ecause it allows 
transaction cost savings, a legal regime that recognizes the validity of after-ac-
quired property clauses is more efficient than one that does not." Jackson & 
Kronman, supra note 7, at 1167 (footnote omitted). 
176. One such cost would be a reduction in the availability of credit. Be-
cause other creditors are placed at a disadvantage, the debtor's cost of future 
credit would be higher than it would be if the security interest were limited. 
177. After-acquired property financing arrangements best lend themselves 
to situations where a creditor lends money on a more or less continuing basis. 
See R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS, & J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW, 
213-242 (2d ed. 1974). These types of creditors would not normally base a 
claim to the mass solely on § 9-315(1). 
178. One exception to this proposal is when the party claiming under § 9-
315(1) seeks purchase money status. To receive such status, the party seeking 
that treatment should bear the burden of apportioning the mass. See infra 
note 198 and accompanying text. 
179. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text. 
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such a case, fairness,180 efficiency,181 and uniformity182 favor 
limiting the secured party's interest only by the amount of the 
secured debt. 
C. THE NATURE OF THE SECURITY INTEREST 
Although a security interest continues in a product or mass 
if the prerequisites of section 9-315(1) have been satisfied, that 
subsection offers no guidance on whether the security interest 
continues as a purchase money security interest183 if it was of 
that type originally.184 Purchase money status is significant 
only where a competing claim to the collateral is asserted by a 
party other than the debtor, usually another secured party.185 
For this reason, the nature of a section 9-315(1) security inter-
est must be analyzed in this context. 
Where the opposing claimants to a product or mass are 
both secured parties, a priority dispute is possible on one of two 
180. See supra notes 160-161, 164 and accompanying text. 
181. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
182. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
183. A purchase money security interest is defined in § 9-107 as follows: 
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the ex-
tent that it is 
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all 
or part of its price; or 
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an 
obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or 
the use of collateral if such value is in fact so used. 
184. Another question unanswered in the section is whether the perfected 
security interest in the original collateral continues perfected in the product or 
mass. Although Professor Gilmore has stated that "there can be no doubt that 
the 'continuing' interest is also perfected and presumably will so continue as 
long as the original interest would have been perfected,'' 2 G. GILMORE, supra 
note 10, § 31.4, at 846, things may not be quite so simple where perfection is 
governed by rules lying outside Article 9. For example, under § 9-302(3), 
perfection requirements regarding motor vehicles may be governed by non-
Code state law. Because an interest in collateral affixed to a motor vehicle 
may attach under § 9-315(1) to the vehicle itself, continued perfection arguably 
depends on compliance with state certificate of title law. Cf. In re Lyford, 22 
Bankr. 222, 226 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982) (certificate of title law supplants § 9-
314(1)); International Atlas Servs., Inc. v. Twentieth Century Aircraft Co., 251 
Cal. App. 2d 434, 438, 59 Cal. Rptr. 495, 499 (1967) (Federal Aviation Act sup-
plants § 9-314), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1038 (1968); Wooden v. Michigan State 
Bank, 117 Ga. App. 852, 854, 162 S.E.2d 222, 223 (1968) (certificate of title law 
supplants § 9-314(1)). 
185. This does not necessarily pertain where a debtor is the subject of a 
bankruptcy proceeding. In such event purchase money status may matter in 
the absence of a third party claimant. For example, the Bankruptcy Code 
gives a consumer debtor the power to avoid certain non-purchase money secur-
ity interests. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982). 
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levels. A section 9-315(1) creditor might be opposed either by 
another section 9-315(1) creditor or by a party whose security 
interest in the product or mass is in no way dependent on sec-
tion 9-315. The level of dispute involved will dictate the appro-
priate priority rule and the nature of the continuing security 
interest. If both competing secured parties are asserting an in-
terest under section 9-315(1), the applicable priority rule is sec-
tion 9-315(2).186 Although the application of the formula itself 
is somewhat confusing,187 the intent of the rule is clear. The 
"rank equally"188 language of the text, together with the com-
ment's explanation that "[t]he rule stated treats all ... inter-
ests as being of equal priority,"189 leaves little doubt that 
purchase money status is irrelevant. 
When the section 9-315(1) claimant is opposed by a secured 
party whose interest has attached other than through section 9-
315(1), however, purchase money status may become important. 
In such a case, the conflict should be settled not by section 9-
315(2)'s priority rule,190 but by other rules that grant purchase 
money status priority in certain situations. The conclusion of 
Professors Jackson and Kronman that "[t]here is no reason, 
based either upon the statutory scheme of the Code or upon 
general considerations of policy, why the transferred security 
interest cannot, or should not, remain a purchase money secur-
ity interest,"191 therefore, needs to be re-examined. 
In the case of a section 9-315(1) product, there are several 
reasons to deny purchase money status to secured creditors. In-
itially, such status would entitle the secured party to the super-
priority granted in section 9-312(3) or (4).192 Further, this 
186. For a discussion of the applicability and application of this subsection, 
see infra notes 199-239 and accompanying text. 
187. See infra notes 222-239 and accompanying text. 
188. u.c.c. § 9-315(2). 
189. U.C.C. § 9-315 comment 4. 
190. Although several courts and commentators have assumed that § 9-
315(2) should apply in all conflicts between secured parties where one party 
asserts a claim under § 9-315(1), such an approach is not mandated by § 9-
315(2). This issue is treated in more detail infra notes 199-220 and accompany-
ing text. 
191. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 2, at 29; see a"lso In re Smith, 29 
Bankr. 690, 693 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (a purchase money security interest 
continues under § 9-315 even if the collateral is transformed through manufac-
turing, processing or assembly). 
192. Under § 9-312(3) and (4), purchase money security interests take pri-
ority over conflicting interests if certain requirements are met. See § 9-312(3), 
(4). Election of treatment under these provisions assumes that the competing 
secured party was first to file a financing statement. H the facts were other-
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super-priority will be enjoyed regardless of the relative values 
of its original collateral and the final product. In the event of 
the debtor's default, the section 9-315(1) creditor, with priority 
over the prior secured party, would have the right to control 
the disposition of the collateral.193 Because the Code sheds lit-
tle light on the rights and remedies of priority and subordinate 
secured parties vis-a-vis each other, the now subordinated credi-
tor would find his or her position mired in uncertainty.194 This 
added uncertainty would inevitably manifest itself in a higher 
rate of compensation demanded from the debtor.195 Another 
unfortunate consequence would be that the section 9-315(1) 
creditor, who is presumably owed considerably less than the 
value of the completed product, would lack the incentive to 
maximize the sale price of that product because he or she 
would not be entitled to any amount greater than the amount 
of the secured debt.196 
Another important reason to deny purchase money status 
to creditors with a section 9-315(1) interest in a product is that 
a party with a prior security interest in the product will often 
be unaware of any loss of priority. Such knowledge would be 
important if and when a future advance is contemplated. N oti-
fication to the prior secured party becomes necessary, however, 
only if he or she "had filed a financing statement covering the 
same types of inventory" as the section 9-315(1) secured party's 
original collateral.197 Although this may often be the case, it 
need not always be. If the financing statement filed by the 
product financer covers only the finished product, notice is not 
required and the loss of priority would be unknown. To avoid 
this unknown loss of priority it would be necessary to either 
expand the scope of the original security interest or carefully 
wise, the § 9-315(1) creditor would assert priority under the "first in time" rule 
of § 9-312(5). 
193. See, e.g., American Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. 0. & E., Inc., 40 
Colo. App. 306, 309, 576 P.2d 566, 568 (1978); Suburbia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n 
v. Bel-Air Conditioning Co., 385 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); 
Recchio v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 55 Misc. 2d 788, 793, 286 
N.Y.S.2d 390, 395 (Sup. Ct. 1968), rev'd, 35 A.D.2d 769, 316 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1970). 
194. Many of the issues surrounding the rights and remedies of competing 
secured parties are explored in Nickles, Rights and Remedies Between UCC 
Article 9 Secured Parties with Conflicting Security Interests in Goods, 68 low A 
L. REV. 217 (1983). 
195. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
196. See supra text accompanying notes 160-161. 
197. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3). 
48 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1 
monitor the debtor's activities after the original extension of 
credit. 
Although the above analysis is equally applicable to a se-
curity interest which attaches to a product pursuant to section 
9-315(l)(a) or (b), different considerations lead to a different 
conclusion where the claim is to a section 9-315(1)(a) mass. The 
reasons that militate against a purchase money security interest 
continuing in a product are simply not present when a commin-
gled mass is involved. A mass is apportionable and it is there-
fore possible to recognize a superior right of disposition, limited 
to a portion of the whole. When so limited, one no longer en-
counters many of the difficulties resulting from multiple claims 
to a single item, nor does there exist the potential disparity be-
tween the value of the collateral and the amount of the debt 
that is so troublesome in the case of a product. Finally, section 
9-312(3) would eliminate the possibility of a secret priority. Be-
cause the first financing statement would describe the same 
type of goods as those supplied by the purchase money secured 
party, notice would be required under section 9-312(3). If the 
purchase money secured party can successfully trace his or her 
collateral into the mass,198 there seems to be no reason why 
that status should not be preserved. 
IV. THE SECTION 9-315(2) PRIORITY RULE 
A. THE RULE'S APPLICABILITY 
As noted earlier,199 section 9-315 differs from most Code 
sections in that it not only governs the attachment of security 
interests but also provides a priority rule for resolving conflict-
ing claims. Perhaps because these two topics are addressed in 
the same section, it frequently has been taken for granted that 
if a security interest attaches to a mass or product under sec-
tion 9-315(1), the priority of that interest should always be gov-
erned by section 9-315(2).20° This assumption arguably is 
incorrect; not every conflict involving a section 9-315(1) claim is 
governed by section 9-315(2). Statutory construction and policy 
198. See supra note 178. 
199. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
200. See, e.g., In re San Juan Packers, Inc., 696 F.2d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1983); 
2 G. GILMORE, supra note 10, § 31.5, at 854-56; SECURED TRANSACTIONS, supra 
note 130, § 7.11A[2][y]; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 2, at 29 n.118; Hogan, 
Financing the Acquisition of New Goods Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 3 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 115, 152-53 (1962); cf. U.C.C. § 9-312(1) (stat-
ing that "[t]he rules of priority stated in other sections of this Part ... shall 
govern when applicable .... "). 
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considerations support the view that other priority rules will 
often apply. 
When determining the scope of a priority rule, the logical 
starting point is the language of the rule itself. Section 9-315(2) 
states: "When under subsection (1) more than one security in-
terest attaches to the product or mass, they rank equally ac-
cording to the ratio that the cost of the goods to which each 
interest originally attached bears to the cost of the total prod-
uct or mass."201 When given its plain meaning, the rule's intro-
ductory language seems to limit its applicability to situations in 
which each competing security interest has attached under sec-
tion 9-315(1). If one or more security interests have attached to 
the product or mass by means other than "under subsection 
(1)," as when a competing claimant is given a security interest 
directly in the end product or mass, another priority rule would 
have to apply.202 
It is unfortunate, but perhaps understandable, that those 
who ascribe to the view that section 9-315(2) applies whenever 
any section 9-315(1) interest is involved have failed to consider 
the implications of such an approach. The subsection's pro rata 
sharing rule stands in stark contrast to the "winner-loser" ap-
proach of Article 9's other priority rules203 and, as a result, has 
a certain intuitive appeal to one's sense of fairness. Beneath 
such an attractive surface, however, lurk troublesome problems 
that require analysis in the light of the Code's policy-grounded 
priority system. 
An excellent vehicle for discussing both the actual and po-
tential role that section 9-315(2) should play in the Code's well-
ordered system of priorities is In re San Juan Packers, Inc. 204 
San Juan, a food processor, purchased cans on credit from Na-
tional Can Corporation, giving it a security interest in all inven-
tory. San Juan also purchased vegetables on credit from 
several farmers, some of whom had given Peoples State Bank 
(Bank) a security interest in these vegetables. In the ensuing 
bankruptcy of San Juan, the Bank claimed a priority interest in 
201. U.C.C. § 9-315(2) (emphasis added). 
202. Unfortunately, the drafters' comments regarding the priority rule 
shed little light on its intended scope. The comment merely states that the 
rule "is new and is needed because under subsection (1) it is possible to have 
more than one secured party claiming an interest in a product." U.C.C. § 9-315 
comment 4. Note that the comment does not even address conflicting claims 
to a mass. 
203. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301 to 9-314. 
204. 696 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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the farmers' vegetables sold to San Juan and the fund of pro-
ceeds created by their sale. 20s 
Before deciding the appropriate priority rule, the Ninth 
Circuit had to decide whether there actually were two compet-
ing security interests in the mass of vegetables. National Can 
argued that any security interest the Bank originally might 
have had was lost because the vegetables were commingled 
with those purchased from other farmers and were no longer 
identifiable.206 The court had little trouble rejecting this argu-
ment, correctly noting that the Bank's security interest contin-
ued in the mass under section 9-315(1).207 National Can next 
argued that the fund should be apportioned on a pro rata basis 
in accordance with section 9-315(2) because it had a security in-
terest in the entire inventory of vegetables. The court agreed 
with this assertion and remanded the case for an apportion-
ment of the fund.2os 
In deciding that the section 9-315(2) priority rule applies 
where only one claimant's interest attached under section 9-
315(1),209 the San Juan court failed to realize the effect that 
such a rule has on the Code's system of notice filing. To illus-
trate this point, assume that the facts of San Juan were slightly 
different in that the farmers retained a purchase money secur-
ity interest in vegetables they sold directly to San Juan. Fur-
ther assume that San Juan segregated each farmer's vegetables 
such that they remained clearly identifiable. In such a case, 
205. See id. at 707-08. Prior to the action, the parties agreed to the sale of 
San Juan's entire inventory of vegetables and the creation of a fund from the 
sale's proceeds. The purpose of the suit was therefore to determine the com-
peting parties' rights to these proceeds. 
206. See id. at 709-10. The sale of the vegetables to San Juan would not 
have terminated the Bank's security interest even if San Juan had been a 
buyer in the ordinary course of business. See U.C.C. § 9-307(1). 
207. 696 F.2d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1983). The court was also forced to address 
two interesting arguments made by the Bank. The first, surprisingly accepted 
by the district court, was that § 9-315(1) "requires the attachment of two secur-
ity interests to the product or mass." See San Juan, 696 F.2d at 710-11. The 
court disposed of this contention, correctly concluding that the attachment of 
two security interests is "an explicit condition only to the operation of section 
9-315(2), not section 9-315(1)." Id. at 711 (footnote omitted). The second argu-
ment was that the § 9-315(2) priority rule was inapplicable because the vegeta-
bles had not been sufficiently processed. The court responded that § 9-
315(1) (a) and the section title refer to processing and commingling, and that 
there was "no indication that the drafters meant to exclude simple mixing of 
fungible goods." Id. 
208. Id. 
209. National Can's interest attached pursuant to the "floating lien" it had 
on all San Juan's inventory, not because of § 9-315(1). See id. at 708. 
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section 9-315(1) would be irrelevant and section 9-315(2) clearly 
would not apply. Because the farmers' security interests would 
qualify as purchase money interests, their priority over Na-
tional Can, whose security interest would have attached to the 
vegetables pursuant to its after-acquired property clause, would 
have depended upon compliance with section 9-312(3). They 
must, therefore, have given notice of their intended interest to 
National Can before giving their vegetables to San Juan.210 
Such notice is not a mere formality without substance. Its pur-
pose is best stated in Official Comment 3 to section 9-312 which 
reads, in pertinent part: 
The reason for the additional requirement of notification is that typi-
cally the arrangement between an inventory secured party and his 
debtor will require the secured party to make periodic advances 
against incoming inventory or periodic releases of old inventory as 
new inventory is received. A fraudulent debtor may apply to the se-
cured party for advances even though he has already given a security 
interest in the inventory to another secured party. The notification 
requirement protects the inventory financer in such a situation.211 
Now change this hypothetical example so that the vegeta-
bles are commingled and their identity is lost. Section 9-
315(1) (a) would now apply, but the section 9-315(2) priority rule 
certainly should not. Its application would eliminate the notice 
requirement even though National Can's need to receive notice 
is as great as before. Such disparity of treatment is impossible 
to justify.212 · 
Furthermore, the sole act of commingling by the debtor el-
evates the farmers to a position of parity.213 Although Article 9 
provides for a change of priorities as the result of subsequent 
events, never is such an event within the exclusive control of 
the debtor.214 To permit the debtor, either by action or inac-
210. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b). 
211.- U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3. 
212. The drafters may have been concerned that some courts would read 
§ 9-315 as supplanting the notice requirements of § 9-312(3). Such concern 
could explain the inclusion in the early drafts of what was to become § 9-315 of 
a provision that an interest acquired in the mass under that section would be 
subordinate to a prior perfected inventory lien. See supra notes 82-91 and ac-
companying text. 
213. Assuming that the farmers failed to give notice, they would be 
subordinated to the inventory financer where no commingling occurs, yet 
would stand on an equal footing if the vegetables were commingled. See 
u.c.c. §§ 9-312(3), 9-315(2). 
214. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-103(1)(d)(i) (failure of secured party to refile af-
ter collateral is removed to another jurisdiction), 9-403(2) (failure of secured 
party to file a continuation statement). 
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tion, to alter established priorities would open the door to all 
sorts of potential misbehavior. 
Viewed in light of the plain meaning of section 9-315(2)'s 
language, these policy considerations support mandatory appli-
cation only when each competing interest in the whole arises 
under section 9-315(1).215 There may be situations, however, 
where the rule can be helpful even though the Code does not 
mandate its use. As noted earlier,216 several commentators 
favor applying section 9-315(2) by analogy to situations where 
equity concerns so dictate. Indeed, San Juan may have been a 
classic example of a case where, although not required, the rule 
was ultimately beneficial. 
If section 9-315(2) was the wrong priority rule in San Juan, 
it follows that the correct priority rule would have been section 
9-312(5). Under that provision, because National Can had filed 
first, it would have enjoyed an absolute priority over the Bank. 
But, as suggested by at least one commentator,217 the first-to-
file rule was never meant to apply where, as in San Juan, two 
debtors are involved.218" Sanctioning its use would not only 
thwart the justifiable expectations of the Bank219 but would, as 
Professor Clark points out, run counter to "the general prop-
erty rule that you can't alienate what you don't own."220 The 
Ninth Circuit was, therefore, right in applying section 9-315(2), 
but for the wrong reason. 
215. Although the policy concerns discussed in the San Juan context are 
most evident in situations involving conflicting claims to a confused mass, the 
conclusions based thereon arguably apply with equal force in the case of a § 9-
315 product. Initially, § 9-315(2)'s language is nondiscriminatory and requires 
conflicting claims to a product or mass to attach under subsection (1). See 
supra text accompanying notes 201-202. Furthermore, as in the case of a mass, 
a product financer whose security interest attached by means other than 
under § 9-315(1) has no way of knowing that a competing claimant to that 
product has entered the picture. 
216. See supra note 12. 
217. See B. CLARK, supra note 16, § 3.8(4), at 3-53 to 3-54. 
218. For another example of where § 9-312(5), although literally applicable, 
must be ignored, see Frisch, U.C.C. Filings: Changing Circumstances Can 
Make a Right Filing Wrong. But Can They Make a Wrong Filing Right?, 56 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1274-75 (1983). 
219. When the Bank filed its financing statement, it established its priority 
over buyers, § 9-307(1), lien creditors, § 9-301(1)(b), and subsequent secured 
parties who received their interest directly from the farmers, § 9-312(5). It un-
derstandably would come as a surprise to the Bank to learn that its priority 
was lost because of the fortuitous circumstance that its debtor had sold collat-
eral to another secured party's debtor and that that secured party had filed 
first-a filing which was undiscoverable by the Bank. 
220. B. CLARK, supra note 16, 11 3.8(4), at 3-53. 
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B. THE APPLICATION OF THE SECTION 9-315(2) PRIORITY RULE 
Section 9-315(2)'s priority rule attempts to set forth a 
formula by which competing claimants to a product or mass can 
"share ratably" in that product or mass.221 As written, how-
ever, the formula is confusing; not only is its language ambigu-
ous, it also fails to account for the fundamental differences 
between products and masses. The unfortunate result of this 
approach is what one commentator has called a priority rule 
that "raises more questions than it solves."222 To answer these 
questions, it is necessary to examine the rule in light of the 
purpose it was meant to serve: equitable apportionment among 
unequally contributing claimants. 
The first problem raised by the apportionment formula is 
definitional. Under the formula, the respective interest of each 
secured claimant is based on the ratio of the cost of each claim-
ant's original collateral to the cost of the total product or 
mass.223 For example, if A and Beach assert a section 9-315(1) 
security interest in a product or mass,224 their interests under 
the formula could be represented as follows: 
cost of A's original collateral A's interest = -----------
cost of product or mass 
B's interest 
cost of B's original collateral 
cost of product or mass 
The term "cost," however, is not defined in the section or else-
where in the Code, and has a number of possible meanings.225 
By determining functionally what the numerators and denomi-
nators should equal in the above example, it may be possible to 
221. See U.C.C. § 9-315(2), § 9-315 comment 4. 
222. Murray, Priority Problems in Receivables Financing: The German 
Experience and the Uniform Commercial Code Compared, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. 
L. REV. 355, 405 (1970); see also 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 10, § 31.5, at 852 
(stating that "the meaning of the ... formula ... is notably obscure"). 
223. See U.C.C. § 9-315(2). 
224. Recall that § 9-315(2)'s priority rule should usually be used only when 
each competing claimant's interest arose under subsection (1). See supra notes 
199-220 and accompanying text. 
225. As noted by one commentator: 
the term "cost of the total product or mass" is not defined. It is not 
clear whether it refers to the value of the manufactured product or to 
the cost of the components. If it refers to the value of the product, it 
is unclear whether 'cost of the goods' refers to their value at the time 
of incorporation or to the price paid or to be paid for them by the 
debtor. 
Murray, supra note 222, at 405. 
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work backwards and determine what the drafters had in mind 
when they used the term "cost." 
If a product is involved, A and B will have no choice but to 
share ratably226 in the proceeds received from the product's 
eventual sale.227 In that case, the only sensible approach is to 
await the sale and use the amount realized as the denominator 
of each ratio. If, however, the subject of controversy is a mass, 
although a sharing of proceeds is possible, it is not necessary.228 
If the mass is sold without division, the denominator should 
again equal the sum received. If the mass itself, rather than its 
proceeds, is apportioned, the denominator selected should be 
that which will most closely approximate the amount of pro-
ceeds had there been a sale. This would, in most cases, be the 
current market value of the mass. 
Once the ratio's denominator or "pie to share" is estab-
lished, the numerator will yield the percentage of the pie that 
section 9-315(2) allots to A and B. Because the denominator re-
flects, in part, the value of each creditor's original collateral, it 
seems only fair that A and B share according to the proportion-
ate contribution made by their collateral. The best method for 
determining that proportionate contribution is to compare the 
relative values of their collateral at the time of incorporation 
into the product or commingling with the mass. Accordingly, if 
A's collateral had a value twice that of B's, A should be entitled 
to a slice of the pie that is correspondingly twice as large. 
Having decided that the formula should be geared to 
value,229 we are equipped to examine the subsection's focus on 
cost. One reasonable explanation for this focus is that the 
drafters contemplated value but for efficiency's sake chose in-
stead to base the formula on what they thought to be a suitable 
226. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 10, § 31.5, at 852 ("The secured parties 
who rank equally do not of course share equally: they share, as the Comment 
puts it, 'ratably.' "). 
227. Because § 9-314 would be inapplicable, the only option available to the 
parties is to sell the otherwise indivisible product as a whole. 
228. Because a mass of goods is physically divisible, apportionment is possi-
ble prior to sale. 
229. At least one court has decided that § 9-315(2) addresses relative value. 
In In re Agricultural Business Co., Bankr. No. 9628-B-1 (D. Kan. Oct. 29, 1976) 
(available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (order granting motion to alter 
or amend), the court totally ignored the subsection's use of the term "cost," 
concluding that the secured party could claim an interest in the mass "to the 
extent of the equivalent dollar value of the fertilizer [the secured party] deliv-
ered." Id. (emphasis added). 
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surrogate.230 Regarding the formula's numerator, whether or 
not the term "cost" indeed approximates the collateral's value 
depends on whether cost was intended to mean acquisition 
price. Although some commentators have espoused such a 
view,231 arguably such is not the intent of the formula. The 
drafters knew how to use the term price when they wished to 
do so.232 Furthermore, price tends to overstate value if it in-
cludes such extraneous costs to the debtor as finance, shipping, 
and other handling charges. If, however, cost is defined so as to 
exclude these expenses, its equivalence to value is apparent.233 
Next consider section 9-315(2)'s statement of the ratio's de-
nominator: "cost of the total product or mass." If the denomi-
nator should ideally equal the amount of proceeds received 
from the disposition of the product or mass, cost could be in-
ferred to mean the cost to the third party purchaser. If the 
product or mass has actually been sold, there is no reason to es-
timate its value by computing its cost to the debtor.234 In the 
case of a product, a "cost to debtor" computation of the compo-
nent parts will not reflect the product's ultimate value since 
the synergistic effect of incorporating the various components 
is not considered. Where a mass is not sold prior to its division, 
however, its cost to the debtor indeed provides a rough estimate 
of its value and is, for that reason, a workable substitute. 
Once the numerator and denominator for each competing 
claimant is determined, the formula's operation is relatively 
straightforward. For example, assume A and B are claimants 
to a section 9-315 mass of fungible goods. If the cost to the 
debtor of A and B's original collateral was $3 and $5 respec-
230. The drafters could have been seeking to avoid many of the time-con-
suming inquiries that inevitably become part of any valuation process. See 
supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
231. See, e.g., 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 10, § 31.5, at 852; Hogan, supra note 
200, at 153. 
232. See Hogan, supra note 200, at 153 n.151 (" 'Costs' are not clearly de-
fined, and an argument that the term includes more than acquisition price ... 
may be made from the fact that elsewhere the Code uses terms clearly indicat-
ing 'price.' U.C.C. §§ 9-107, 9-302(1)(C), 9-307(2), and 9-505.''). 
233. The problem of what charges should be considered as part of a good's 
cost is reminiscent of the similar problem of what charges, other than the cash 
price of a good, should be accorded purchase money status. See, e.g., Note, Pre-
serving the Purchase Money Status of Refinanced or Commingled Purchase 
Money Debt, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1177-78 (1983). 
234. This approach also avoids the need to indulge in the difficult task of 
allocating a portion of the debtor's total labor and overhead costs to the partic-
ular item involved. 
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tively and the cost of the total mass is $10,235 A would receive 
3/io of the mass and B would receive 5/10.236 If the mass had been 
sold upon default, the amount A and B receive obviously would 
depend on the sale price. If the sale price were $8, A would re-
ceive 3/s of $8, or $3, and B would receive 5/s of $8, or $5. If the 
sale price had been $10, A and B would again receive $3 and $5 
respectively, and $2 would go to the debtor. If the sale price 
had been $7, however, the formula will not work, because it is 
impossible for A to receive 3h of $7, or $3, while B receives 5h of 
$7, or $5. In such a case, A and B should share the $7 in a 3-to-5 
ratio, with A getting 3/s of $7, or $2.62, and B getting 5/s of $7, or 
$4.38. In this case, the amounts of A and B's secured debt 
would be irrelevant,237 as would the purchase money status of 
either claimant.23s 
If the claim is to a section 9-315 product, the situation 
changes somewhat. For example, assume X and Y are compet-
ing claimants to a product that was sold for $15 at a disposition 
sale.239 The cost to the debtor of X's original collateral was $3 
and the amount of X's secured debt was $4, while the cost to 
the debtor of Y's original collateral was $5 and the amount of 
Y's secured debt was $7. Although X's security interest extends 
to the value of the secured debt,240 i.e., $4, the formula dictates 
that when opposed by Y, X is entitled initially to claim only 3/is 
of $15, or $3. Similarly, Y may initially claim 5/is of $15, or $5. 
Seven dollars are left over when both of these claims are satis-
fied, so X and Y may now claim additional proceeds up to the 
values of their secured debts. X thus ends up with $4, Y with 
$7, and the debtor with $4. If the disposition price had been $10 
instead of $15, after the initial $3 and $5 claims had been satis-
fied, X and Y would be able to share the remaining $2 in a 3-to-
235. These figures are borrowed, with slight modification, from the hypo-
thetical offered by Professor Gilmore. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 10, § 31.5, 
at 852-53. 
236. These examples assume for simplicity's sake that there are no addi-
tional claimants to the mass or product whose claim arises other than under 
§ 9-315. If such ,;1 claimant does exist, arguably § 9-315(2) should apply be-
tween any § 9-315(1) claimants and other priority rules would usually govern 
disputes between these § 9-315(1) claimants and non § 9-315(1) claimants. See 
supra notes 199-220 and accompanying text. 
237. See supra notes 165-179 and accompanying text. 
238. See supra notes 188-189 and accompanying text. 
239. As discussed supra notes 226-227 and accompanying text, because 
products are indivisible, § 9-315 claimants have no choice but to assert their 
claims against the proceeds received when the product is sold. See supra notes 
226-227 and accompanying text. 
240. See supra notes 159-164 and accompanying text. 
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5 proportion.241 X would then have received a total of $3.75 and 
Y would have received $6.25. 
CONCLUSION 
Under section 9-315(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, a 
perfected security interest in goods can continue in the product 
or mass of which those goods have become part. When two or 
more security interests attach to a product or mass under sub-
section (1), the subsection (2) priority rule governs these com-
peting interests and allows the claimants to share ratably either 
in the mass itself or in the proceeds received when a product or 
mass is sold subsequent to the debtor's default. Although the 
general purposes of the section seem clear, problems can de-
velop when it is applied to different types of fact situations. 
Many of these problems arise because the section fails to take 
into account the fundamental differences between products and 
masses. The pre-Code property doctrines of accession, specifi-
cation, and confusion, upon which the section is grounded, are 
helpful references when determining if these fundamental dif-
ferences necessitate different treatment of products and masses 
under both section 9-315(1) and (2). 
Although the section's scope and potential usefulness are 
broad, it remains relatively unknown and rarely used in com-
mercial litigation. The reasons for this obscurity are puzzling 
because it would seem that section 9-315 would be important in 
a wide variety of commingling242 and processing-type243 situa-
241. This situation is similar to the one described supra text accompanying 
notes 236-237, where the formula cannot be used. In both cases, if the cash 
available for distribution is used as the denominator, a payout in excess of 
100% of the proceeds received would be required. 
242. An example of a situation in which § 9-315 apparently would have 
been useful is Associated Poultry, Inc. v. Wake Farmers Coop., Inc., 17 N.C. 
App. 722, 195 S.E.2d 325 (1973). In that case, the Farmers Home Administra-
tion held a perfected security interest in the debtor's eggs and their proceeds. 
Wake Farmers Cooperative, Inc. (Wake) purchased eggs from the debtor, 
agreeing to pay the price directly to the FHA. When received by Wake, the 
value of the eggs was recorded and the eggs were then commingled with eggs 
of other farmers. Before the purchase price was paid, however, Wake was 
placed in receivership. The FHA asserted priority over unsecured creditors on 
the ground "that Wake acted as a trustee holding the purchase price of the 
eggs in trust." Id. at 723, 195 S.E.2d at 326. The court rejected this contention, 
holding that "[the FHA] failed to establish anything beyond a debtor and cred-
itor relationship between them and Wake." Id. at 724, 195 S.E.2d at 327. The 
FHA would arguably have fared better had it asserted an interest under § 9-
315(1) rather than trust beneficiary status. Under § 9-315, its security interest 
would have continued in the mass of commingled eggs and would therefore 
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tions. In any event, section 9-315 can often be a useful tool for 
secured parties who take the time to probe its mysteries. Hope-
have had priority over the competing general creditors. Presumably, igno-
rance of § 9-315 led to the FHA's loss. 
The above discussion presupposes that the sale to Wake did not terminate 
the FHA's interest. Although§ 9-307(1) would be of no benefit to Wake, § 9-
306(2) provides that a transferee takes free of a security interest if the transfer 
was authorized by the secured party; which in this case it was. The FHA's 
consent, however, was contingent on a payment which failed to materialize. 
Because performance of this condition was within the control of Wake, non-
compliance should result in vitiation of the consent, see In re Sunriver Farms, 
Inc., 27 Bankr. 655, 665 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982); Lisbon Bank & Trust Co. v. Mur-
ray, 206 N.W.2d 96, 98(Iowa1973); South Omaha Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Tyson's, 
Inc., 189 Neb. 702, 704, 204 N.W.2d 806, 808 (1973). For another, more recent 
example of a court's failure to consider § 9-315, notwithstanding its applicabil-
ity, see In re McBee, 714 F.2d 1316, 1325-31 (5th Cir. 1983) (determining the 
extent and priority of three security interests following a bulk transfer of in-
ventory and its subsequent commingling with after-acquired property). 
The Code itself suggests the applicability of § 9-315 in a slightly different 
commingling context. Section 9-306(5) allows a chattel paper secured party to 
take priority over an inventory secured party in "returned inventory." See 
U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(b). Once returned, however, commingling with identical in-
ventory becomes a possibility. If such is the case, the chattel paper secured 
party may be unable to identify the original inventory. As noted in Skilton & 
Dunham, Security Interests in Returned and Repossessed Goods Under Article 
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 WILLAMETTE L.J. 779 (1981): 
[i]n some cases, it may be difficult or impossible to trace or identify a 
part of all of the inventory as goods returned to the dealer. Tracing a 
returned automobile with its serial number or other readily identifi-
able items may present no difficulty. Smaller items such as clothing 
or toothpaste, however, pose real tracing problems. 
Id. at 816. If identification is thus impossible, § 9-315 is needed to enable the 
chattel paper secured party to maintain priority. See id. at 815-18. 
243. Consider, for example, the commercial operation variously referred to 
as " 'refining,' 'processing,' 'milling,' 'converting,' 'upgrading,' and 'tolling,' " as 
described in Harrington, A Caveat for Commodity Processing Industries: In-
solvent Processors' Creditors vs. Putative Owners of Raw Materials, 16 U.C.C. 
L.J. 322, 323 (1984). Regardless of the label, the operation essentially consists 
of converting raw or scrap materials into finished products, frequently by one 
other than the owner of the materials. Often, similar materials obtained from 
different sources are commingled by the processor. See id. at 322. Although 
Professor Harrington would argue that such a delivery of raw materials to a 
processor should be viewed as a sale, see id. at 335, most courts would classify 
it as a bailment, see, e.g., In re Sitkin Smelting & Ref., Inc., 639 F.2d 1213, 1217 
(5th Cir. 1983); In re Medomak Canning Co., 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
437, 448 (Bankr. D. Me. 1977). Whether classified as a sale or a bailment, the 
materials when received by the processor will usually be subject to a security 
interest. If the transaction is characterized as a bailment, the materials would 
remain subject to any security interest previously given by the owner. See 
U.C.C. § 9-201. If characterized as a sale, the original owner would often re-
serve a security interest to secure the processor's obligation to process and re-
turn the material in its upgraded form. In any event, for the interest to 
continue following a commingling, § 9-315 is needed. 
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fully, this Article has provided needed guidance in unraveling 
some of these complexities. 

